It is said that one bad cop makes all cops bad. (At least, it seems to in the media or in public perception.) It certainly serves the purpose of someone predisposed to criticize or disapprove. High profile cases of abuse in New York City or Los Angeles police forces have besmirched the reputations of all honest policemen. Similarly, the soldiers involved with this abuse incident have not only sullied their profession, their service, their comrades and their country, but the entire Western world and all it stands for. Under the circumstances it pains me to refer to them as soldiers, but until they are found guilty by court-martial they are entitled to the name.

But it is critical to acknowledge that as ugly as this incident may turn out to be it is strictly that: an aberration, an anomaly in the way American soldiers conduct themselves. Regrettably it does happen. History is rife with examples. Within a month after parachuting into Normandy the 101st Airborne Division, perhaps the best unit in the war at the time, tried and convicted several soldiers of rape, robbery and assault. Cases of German POWs being summarily executed were so common as to be largely unreported. Incidents of civilian deaths associated with combat were treated as incidental and the cost war. Systematic looting was ubiquitous.

What is truly remarkable is that nothing like this has occurred in Iraq. Historically this may be the cleanest military campaign ever waged by an army unparalleled in its restrain and honesty. Consequently the disclosure of the prisoner abuse becomes even more of a case for indignation.

So where ought we focus on this? Predictably the usual suspects are rushing forward with the Vietnam comparisons. It’s My Lai this time though there is absolutely no similarity. It gives the Hate America First group something to focus on. Amnesty International, displaying its usual selective condemnation, is leveling hysteric accusations of ‘widespread and systemic’ abuses by U.S. forces. Indignant Congressmen demand instant answers. And the normally inflammatory Arab news agencies such as al-Jazeera, are having a field day pillorying the Americans.

So what to do? First we must make certain that those responsible - the perpetrators of the acts and their supervisors - are property identified, investigated and brought to account. If found guilty, their punishment must be swift and harsh. Fortunately a military court-martial is usually both. Most importantly, the chain of command needs to be held accountable. The protest of Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, who was in charge of the Military Police unit at the Abu Ghraib prison, that “I didn’t know anything like this was going on” sounds disingenuous.

It is axiomatic in the military that the immediate commander is responsible for everything the unit does or fails to do – no exceptions, no excuses. Tough questions need to be asked: if officers in command did not know what was happening, why not? Did they shirk their duty and responsibility? If they knew and did not act, then they must be brought to account. If, as the General implied, her soldiers were ordered to “soften up” the prisoners by some dark intelligence presence - Army or CIA - then those people must also be brought to answer for their actions. And even if such an order were to exist, it would not absolve Karpinski of neglect.

If we are to draw a practical lesson from Vietnam - a far more useful exercise than trying to morph Iraq prisoner abuse into the mass murder of My Lai - it ought to be accountability. In contrast to Vietnam, the military in Iraq – and not civilian media – uncovered the abuse and launched investigations. The chain of command was informed. Once the incident splashed into the public eye, those in charge acknowledged the event, expressed their disgust and pledged to get to the bottom of it. All good things and far different than the knee-jerk coverup the institution tried to perpetrate 35 years ago.

At the time of My Lai the army wanted to push responsibility down to the lowest possible level. As a consequence platoon leader, Second Lieutenant William Calley was the fall guy. Obviously he was responsible, but what about his company commander, Captain Ernest Medina, who had to be aware of what happened? Medina was allowed to resign his commission and leave the service. The battalion commander, a Lieutenant Colonel Henderson, had been killed in a helicopter crash after the events at My Lai occurred. The army used this as a “responsibility cutout” and stopped at that level.

Such willingness to dump on subordinates is repugnant to those of us who served and who accepted the awesome responsibility that comes with leading soldiers in combat. It is critical for the credibility of the institution itself - as well as the Bush administration - that those who bear responsibility as far up the chain as is appropriate answer the tough questions. Fortunately this appears to be exactly what is happening as you read this.

How far up the food chain ought the responsibility go? Certainly Karpinski, as installation commander, bears responsibility. It is doubtful that one ought to expect anyone above her level (e.g., the theater or major commander) to be responsible for details at a unit level. Having said that, these supervisors would now be expected, in view of this incident, to extend feelers deeper than usual until they are satisfied that order has been restored.

One also has to wonder just where the senior enlisted personnel were in all of this, the sergeants major and unit first sergeants? Someone ought to be speaking with those individuals. Nothing like this incident could have happened without their knowledge and approval. For those with military experience that is troubling. Was the entire supervisory element asleep? Or complicit?

Naturally al-Jazeera and other “Arab Street” propaganda organs have expressed terrible indignation over this incident. The hyperbolic comparisons to the Nazis and, oddly, “Zionists” are popping up everywhere. Arabs, we hear are “outraged and inflamed.” “See,” leftist academics and Arabist ex-diplomats say, “they are going to hate us even more now.”

From a practical standpoint, it is difficult to see how. For decades, if not centuries, Arab peoples have been pawns of the mullahs in their mosques. They have been puppets of tyrants and dictators who control all media and mold their thoughts and behavior. They danced in the streets in joy when the Twin Towers collapsed. They bounce on the hoods of destroyed Humvees and drag American bodies through the streets.

Until they begin to wise-up to the fact that they are thwarting those who are fighting to liberate them, I worry less about the Arab Street losing its “good will” than I would fret about a recurring Ice Age. For the short term, their hatred is a given. Slowly, methodically, we may be able to change that perception. But it took centuries to mold and may take as long to heal.