Rosenau: Capturing al-Zawahiri would clearly be a major victory for the global campaign against al-Qa'ida. Bin Laden has been al-Qa'ida's public face, and he is al-Qa'ida, as far as most people are concerned. In some respects, however, al-Zawahiri is a far more sinister figure. A former leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Zawahiri has been a profound influence on bin Laden, helping to radicalize him and make him more violent and anti-American. Al-Zawahiri has also served as an ideological transmission belt by injecting into the al-Qa'ida movement the worldviews of individuals like Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian theorist of jihad hanged by Nasser in 1966.

The ongoing hunt for al-Zawahiri also signifies a real commitment on the part of Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf to combat terrorism. Musharraf has been the subject of at least two assassination attempts, and many Pakistanis remain sympathetic to or supportive of al-Qa'ida, so he must be commended for personal and political risks he has taken by going after al-Zawahiri in such a concerted way.

Simon: The U.S. has offered Pakistan the status of "Major Non-NATO Ally," which carries a range of benefits in the areas of military assistance and procurement of weapons. In this context, it is important for President Musharraf to demonstrate his utility to the War on Terrorism.  Sending troops into Waziristan in pursuit of so-called "high value" targets is one important way to do this.  Whether al-Zawahiri was ever there has little to do with this.  The Pakistanis have exaggerated in this vein before and will have an incentive to continue. 

Bringing the war to al-Qa'ida followers in this remote part of Pakistan is something that Musharraf himself had been reluctant to do because of the danger the militants pose to Pakistan's stability and the impossibility of knowing for sure how reliable the army and intelligence services really are.  But two nearly successful assassination attempts by these militants have evidently convinced Musharraf that he has more to gain in American assistance than he has to lose by challenging al-Qa'ida.

Jenkins: It is important that we keep al-Qa'ida's leaders on the run, but we should not overestimate the ease with which they can be captured, especially in the difficult physical and tribal geography of Waziristan.  And we should not overestimate the results if they are killed or captured.  Al-Qa'ida already has transcended its original structure to become an ideology of global jihad.  Its goal is to inspire a global intifada.  We are now dealing with many little al-Qa'idas, led by a new generation yet to be identified.  In one sense, this is progress.  Deprived of the connectivity offered by a centralized operation in Afghanistan, they may not be able to ascend to 9/11 scenarios.  On the other hand, a decentralized jihad may still deliver many Madrids.

FP: Why do you think it has been so hard to capture bin Laden?

Rosenau: The textbook answer is that bin Laden is hidden among a sympathetic population in the rugged "tribal" regions along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. Adding to the challenge is the fact that our preferred form of intelligence gathering--spy satellites and electronic interception--isn't particularly helpful, given the terrain and the general absence of mobile telephone infrastructure. And until recently, the region was a "no-go" area for Pakistani troops. Put simply, we lacked the means, and the Pakistanis lacked the will.

Simon: Assuming that bin Laden is in the border area of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is where the U.S. believes he is hiding, the terrorist leader has significant advantages.  On the Pakistani side of the border, he has little to fear from the U.S., which is permitted only a small presence by Islamabad.  The Pakistani forces themselves are unwelcome in that region.

On the Afghan side, there are about 12,000 American soldiers, most of whom have an array of other security related responsibilities in a country rife with violence.  Specialized personnel have only recently been deployed to Afghanistan from Iraq to participate in the hunt, but they are few in number, although highly capable. 

A change in tactics, which will bring these forces to the field for longer periods and hopefully give them a better feel for the local tribal politics and possibly yield better intelligence, is underway. The U.S. has also brought to bear surveillance aircraft and the Predator long-range drone to photograph likely hiding places and listen for telltale communications that might indicate bin Laden's whereabouts.  But overall, this is still looking for a needle-in-a-haystack, where the haystack hates the people poking around in it.  The terrain is extremely difficult to traverse, the jagged peaks and deep valleys mask movement on the ground as well as communications from airborne eavesdroppers, and there aren't enough troops to cover all the possible avenues of escape from the area.

Jenkins: Experience tells us that fugitives with support structures are hard to find.  General Pershing's pursuit of Pancho Villa, following the Villistas' raid on Columbus, New Mexico in 1916 ended in failure.  U.S. Marines chased Nicaraguan nationalist Augusto Sandino for six years, but he remained free when American forces withdrew from Nicaragua in 1933. French security forces spent 19 years tracking down the infamous terrorist Carlos before capturing him in 1994. 

Warfare is becoming increasingly personalized--manhunts rather than main battles. Look at the manhunts for Manuel Noriega in Panama, Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslavia, Mullah Omar in Afghanistan, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and, of course, al-Qa'ida's remaining leaders.  This creates new demands on intelligence and military forces.

FP: How do you think bin Laden's death or capture would affect al-Qa'ida? The War on Terror?

Rosenau: This is the question that has fascinated journalists and pundits since the late 1990s, when bin Laden entered our consciousness as the man orchestrating an international campaign of anti-American terror. Of course his capture or death would be a huge victory for us, if only because our leaders have said for years that he had to be apprehended or killed. Not doing so would call our credibility into question.

That said, it is unclear what affect bin Laden’s arrest or demise would have on the al-Qa'ida movement. He clearly has iconic status, and serves as a source of inspiration and as a teacher who explains events and puts them into context for his followers.  He is someone who preaches a message, and allows those who take up his call to arms to receive the training, indoctrination, and equipment to commit political murder. We don’t have enough information to determine definitively if he is still directing terrorist operations, or at least approving them.

Bin Laden has never said al-Qa'ida’s survival depends on his own survival. He declared in December 2001 after his escape from Tora Bora in Afghanistan: “God willing, the end of America is imminent. Its end is not dependent on the survival of this slave to God. Regardless if Usama is killed or survives, the awakening has started.” In other words, the struggle continues, whether he is around or not. The Bush administration clearly recognizes this, and has been careful to make it clear over the past few months that bin Laden's death or capture by no means signifies the end of al-Qa'ida.

Many problems would be created if bin Laden is captured alive. A trial would be necessary, creating grave security concerns. Then finding a secure location to imprison bin Laden would be a major problem, and his supporters might launch future terrorist attacks or perhaps take hostages to demand his release.  But a death sentence would solidify bin Laden’s status as a martyr in the eyes of his followers, creating a propaganda image that jihadists could exploit for generations.

Simon: Bin Laden’s death or capture could make some potential recruits to al-Qa'ida think twice about joining the jihad, since it will appear to them as though the US is the unbeatable enemy. But bin-Laden's death is more likely to galvanize the movement than intimidate it.  The jihad is now global, thanks in part to bin Laden, and there are a large number of mid-level operators who can keep terrorist attacks.  All over the Middle East (except of course in Israel) bin Laden's face adorns T-shirts and his name is given to newborns.  The Pew Foundation, which monitors foreign attitudes toward the US through large scale polling recently showed that bin Laden is the political leader most trusted by majorities or significant minorities in a number of Muslim countries to do the right thing in world affairs. 

At this point, bin-Laden can say what Simeon said in Luke's Gospel -- "Lord, Lettest thy servant depart in peace."  The jihad bin Laden launched is well-established and will do just fine without him.

Jenkins: The focus on the most wanted should not mislead us.  We must not only eliminate al-Qa'ida's leaders, but defeat its ideology.

FP:  Is it crucial to kill rather than to capture bin Laden – so as not to spark a furious jihad around the world?  Overall, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the hunt for the al-Qa'ida leader?

Simon: The probability of Usama bin Laden being captured alive is very low.  He wants to be martyred and if the enemy is closing in, he will have his guards kill him, if he doesn’t have the option of going down with guns blazing himself.  He is no Saddam in this respect.  Whether he is killed or captured, his heroic status— carefully cultivated by him over the years through his adopting the poses and “lifestyle” of the fugitive prophet and young warrior fighting the infidel in remote mountains on the frontiers of the empire — will be locked-in for years to come.   

Jenkins: I don't know if bin Laden will allow himself to be taken alive.  I suspect not, but then I was surprised by Saddam Hussein's easy surrender--with a pistol at his side.  Hussein, however, is a serial survivor. As for bin Laden, dead he will join the ranks of revolutionary martyrs.  In custody, he will be a lightening rod for further terrorist attacks, not that these would cease upon his death anyway.  But what a fascinating tale he could tell if we ever persuaded him to talk. 

FP: If President Bush called you today and asked you for advice on what he should do next in the war against al-Qa'ida, what would you tell him?

Rosenau: If forced to pick one piece of advice to give to the president, I'd have to urge him to pursue a serious, strategic-level campaign designed to discredit al-Qa'ida's ideology, the ideational glue that binds together this geographically dispersed movement. What we need is a campaign aimed at preventing al-Qa'ida from attracting new members and keeping its ranks filled with violent fanatics. What is required, in short, is a contemporary version of what George Kennan called "political warfare." Although our strategic situation and our adversary obviously differ from those of the Cold War, I think we have much to learn from our generally successful propaganda activities during that period. To paraphrase the British counterinsurgency theorist and practitioner Frank Kitson, the struggle against al-Qa'ida must be waged in the minds of men and women. From what I've seen so far, we have done little or nothing to fight al-Qa'ida on this level.

Simon: I’d offer pretty much the same advice, but I’m less sure how I would tell him to go about implementing it.  The dialogue that my colleague talks about requires the US to talk about religion.  This of course is something Americans do obsessively among themselves, but as a society —let alone as a state — we don’t talk in these terms to outsiders.  Religious discourse has generally stopped at the water’s edge, with the non-trivial exception of missionary activity.  Setting aside the question of whether we ought to be talking in religious terms and thereby tacitly legitimizing these terms as appropriate to international and intercommunal relations, the clerical communities we would want to reach might not be receptive to Christians and Jews telling them how to interpret their faith.  This project is not an impossible one, but we would need to prepare the ground very carefully.

Just as an example, our original propaganda videos showed a female American Muslim jogging.  The immodesty of her dress was noted by critics of the video, who argued that this would just be more alienating to viewers.  More recent videos show Muslim American women in hijabs and headscarves shopping in supermarkets—but these images just serve to validate a kind of Islamic practice that is being propagated by Saudi-financed indoctrination and which devalues pluralism and freedom of religious expression.  Which video is better?  The jury’s still out. At the same time, we need to watch what we say.  We have tended to express ourselves in the past three years in ways that are offensive to Muslim opinion.  Official statements from Washington that we see as disposable rhetoric have a toxic half-life among Muslims that lasts long after we have forgotten we’ve said whatever it was we said.  

We also need to watch what we do.  This means not feeding Muslim perceptions that we are indifferent to—or hostile to-- their interests. As a practical matter, this would entail a vigorous and focused approach to the Palestine-Israel conflict and a rapid internationalization of the Iraqi occupation.  It would also require measured steps to distance ourselves from governments whose authoritarianism and misrule is blamed on us. As we do these things, we would need to have realistic expectations regarding the effectiveness of these actions.  They are not silver bullets.

Finally I would tell the President to urge European governments to adopt affirmative action programs for their own Muslim populations.  These communities are excluded and angry about it.  If they are not better integrated into European society, they’re going to lash out, both against their own governments and the United States.

Rosenau: I agree with Steve Simon about the problem of the United States and religious discourse--talking about Islam is, and should remain, radioactive, at least as far as the U.S. government is concerned. In arguing that there is an urgent need for a global information campaign aimed at undercutting the appeal of the violent jihadists, I'm not suggesting that the US government make the case against the extremists, at least not directly. Rather, we should be quietly supporting (through both public and private institutions) opponents of the jihadists within the Muslim world. I'm certainly not arguing that US government officials should lecture Muslims on their faith, or that nice State Department videos about Muslim life in America will have much of an effect. Rather, our approach should be indirect. The extremists have many enemies in the Muslim world, a fact our strategy seems to have ignored so far.

Jenkins: The President's speech and Congressional resolution following 9/11 constituted a virtual declaration of war, which, in my view, was necessary to focus our efforts, mobilize national resources, seize the initiative, and escape a tit-for-tat response pattern in responding to terrorism.  That said, the "Global War on Terror" to me is a poor framework for what will be a prolonged and complex struggle.

Certainly we must be relentless in going after the al-Qa'ida jihadist enterprise in all of its dimensions--ideology, proselytization, recruiting, training, financing, structure and operations.  Al- Qa'ida, its affiliates and offspring, must be destroyed.

We may choose to call this campaign a "war" although it involves much more than military action.  I agree with my colleagues that much of the contest is ideological and that we seem to be flat-footed when it comes to political warfare.

I am not sure whether it is better to depict Muslim women in America with or without veils.  Given the media-rich society in which we all live, I am not sure that a few U.S.-sponsored videos or broadcasts will fundamentally alter perceptions, which are determined by the deluge of popular culture.  Our contributions to current religious debates within Islam will be appropriately discounted.  And I am not sure that improved public diplomacy will win over many Arabs or Muslims who, while they may think the jihadists are dangerous crackpots, remain hostile to American policies, which we are not about to change.

While we pursue our campaign against the jihadists, we have yet to work out how we are going to deal with other terrorist organizations like Hamas or Hizbollah.  Declarations that we are going to take them down one after another sound too much like the bellicose rhetoric that precedes professional wrestling matches. Reality suggests a more pragmatic approach, unless we are, in fact, ready to assume the combined role of global sheriff and sanitation service.

We will continue to combat terrorism and participate in all efforts to make the operational environment more hostile to the terrorists, as we have done for the past 35 years, but the term "combat" implies an enduring task.

Use of the word "terror" in the GWOT, rather than "terrorism," implies state actors.  True, terrorists feed off failed states.  Some states support terrorism. Some states also are attempting to clandestinely develop weapons of mass destruction.  And terrorists will benefit indirectly from proliferation, although I think the readiness of even rogue states to supply terrorists with weapons of mass destruction is an assertion that merits some argument. Nor should we seek comfort in an assumption that, without state support, terrorists cannot ascend to frightening levels of violence.  But to conflate these diverse strands into a single hyphenated foe leads to poor analysis and poorer policy.

Finally, we do need to increase homeland security, but without creating a "security state," destroying our economy, irrevocably altering our way of life, and undermining our basic values. Security needs to be more creative than proliferating perimeters. And Americans need to get real about risk.