To discuss this issue with us today, Frontpage Symposium welcomes Alex Alexiev, a former senior analyst at the RAND Corporation who is currently a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy in Wash. D.C.; Nir Boms, Vice President, The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies; Bassam Haddad, an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University and Editor of the Arab Studies Journal; and David Kaiser, the author of Politics and War: European Conflict from Phillip II to Hitler, Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War and American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War (Harvard University Press, 2000.

Interlocutor: Welcome gentlemen to Frontpage Symposium. It is clear that the Syrian regime is sponsoring terror, engaging in hostile actions against American troops in Iraq and expanding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. Is it time for U.S. forces to do to the Syrian regime what it did to Saddam’s?

Alexiev: Syria has indeed become a serious impediment to accomplishing U.S. objectives in Iraq and remains a key obstacle to the prospects of regional peace and democratization. Domestically, the rather sanguine expectations that Bashar Al Assad will pursue a reformist course have been largely dashed and, wittingly or not, he appears to follow the retrograde agenda of his late father's powerful coterie that runs the country. Damaskus continues to occupy and refashion Lebanon in its own oppressive image and actively support all manner of terrorism from Hezbollah to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. More disturbingly still, there is growing evidence that the Syrian regime is actively seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction and delivery means for them with the help of Iran and North Korea and there are also ongoing investigations on alleged secret transfers of Iraqi WMD into Syrian custody before Iraqi Freedom began.

With the evidence of Syrian complicity in the infiltration of hundreds of suicide bombers and assorted Jihadists into Iraq from its territory now well established, it is clear that the United States could not and should not tolerate Syrian subversion if it is to win the peace in Iraq. The problem, of course, is that a military solution is not in the cards until the situation in Iraq is stabilized. This does not mean that we do nothing in the meantime and I hope that this forum will help lay out the pros and cons of Washington's present policy options.

Boms: Few recent developments have helped create a new policy “heat wave” on the Syrian issue. These included the involvement of Syrian nationals and Syrian sponsored terrorists in anti-American terrorism activity in Iraq, an increased terrorism funding and training activity in Syrian controlled Lebanon and very recently, the arrest of Capt. James Yee, A U.S Muslim Chaplin who spent four years in Syria and is now under suspects of espionage and treason.  An increased diplomatic and political pressure may appear to yield some results  - but judging by the Syrian record these will superficial and short lived.

As long as the Baath party remains in power and the land of Lebanon remains a Syrian prisoner, a voluntary change will not take place in Syria. However the question of military intervention has less to do with Syria and more to do with the tactical ability to handle an additional front and with the wisdom of doing so in light of the current development in the region. One should remember that the Iraq campaign lasted for over a decade, a time that allowed the Iraqis to develop a possible alternative to the Baath’ist rule. It also enabled the beginning of cooperation between pro-change parties in Iraq and the West.

Opening an additional Syrian front appears premature at this point. However, the presence of American soldiers in the region should be utilized to send the right message to Damascus and to get a better handle on the Syrian involvement in Iraq, Lebnon and the I-L terrorism arena.  We already know that diplomacy cannot effectively fight terrorism alone. Hence the intervention question should not be entirely taken out of the discussion table.

Kaiser: Mr. Alexiev and Mr. Boms seem to me to be awfully optimistic regarding the situation in Iraq--which looks to me to be very threatening--and therefore, hopeful that Iraq still will be simply step one in the creation of a pro-American and Israel-accepting Arab Middle East.  Certainly it is not clear to me that the ten-year campaign against Iraq created the basis for a new and stable regime there.  Were the Ba'ath regime in Syria to disappear, it looks to me as if Lebanon would rapidly sink back into chaos (the reason the US acquiesced in the Syrian role there, albeit tacitly), and Syria might follow.  I do not believe any Arab regime, with the possible exception of Egypt, will stop young men from going to Iraq to fight.  In an effort to achieve greater clarity, I would like to ask them what they think the real goal of the overthrow of Saddam was. Was it to fight terror--with which Saddam had few, if any connections, and which now DOES have a new breeding ground, as many predicted? Or was it simply to topple a relatively strong anti-American and anti-Israel regime?  At this point I honestly don't know, myself.

Haddad: Jamie, before even responding to the comments of the other panelists, I have to say that the premise of your question is patently false, according to known facts and the overwhelming majority of humanity unless one is ready to make explicit distinctions between humans based on race, ethnicity, or some other genetic difference. This type of not-so-subtle prejudice leads to concerns with Syria working on Weapons of Mass Destruction while ignoring the most violent and only existing expansionist Apartheid state, Israel, which has more than 200 nuclear heads. When will we learn that racism and/or ignorance do not pay, and will only deepen the pain and suffering all around?

This is the same mentality that got us into Iraq’s quick sand and now fails to get us out of this horrible mess, either because of lack of knowledge or because of diminished intellectual capacities caused by the same racist blinders. For every day that goes by in Iraq is evidence that not only are/were we clueless in our Iraq adventure, but that we should engage in some serious damage control in the region: we should stop supporting our undemocratic allies like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and stop supporting allies like Israel that practice daily state terror against the Palestinians. At that point, the U.S. would have some credibility in demanding that Syria should democratize its political system and refashion its relationship with Lebanon.

But to keep authoritarian Egypt and Apartheid Israel on the loose while demanding that Syria stop supporting groups that resist Israeli occupation and aggression in Lebanon will only further the isolation of the U.S. administration globally, and, it seems, nationally (according to polls that show increasing dissatisfaction at home with the Iraq situation). To end terrorism and oppression, we must first stop supporting and funding them in the region. After all, the brutal Saddam was the U.S.’s sweetheart in the 1980s.

Alexiev: To start with Mr. Kaiser's last question, I believe that we went into Iraq for a very good reason and that is it to prevent Saddam's outlaw regime from developing and using WMD against us and others. The fact that they have not been found yet or may have been moved to Syria or elsewhere does not change the incontrovertible reality that Saddam both had and used such  weapons in the past. Just as, contrary to what he implies, there is plenty of evidence of Saddam's support for terrorist groups and individuals, be it Hamas, Ansar ul-Islam or Al Qaeda operatives recuperating in Baghdad. And in the process of acting to insure our own security and force the regime to abide by international norms of conduct, which the U.N. mandated, but refused to enforce, we toppled not a "relatively strong anti-American and anti-Israel regime," but the regime of a mass murderer who deserves a place in the enviable company of Hitler, Stalin and Pol Pot. What kind of moral relativism does it take not to make a distinction between the two categories?

Which brings me be back to the question of Syria. Mr. Kaiser seems to believe that if the Baath regime in Damascus disappears, both Lebanon and Syria will promptly slide into chaos, thus implying that it might deserve our support as the lesser of two evils. If this is the best we can get, then there really is no hope for Syria and the Arab world beyond. But it isn't. There are those of us that believe that Arabs are no less capable than anybody else of building a just, democratic and prosperous society.  And it wasn't that long ago that Lebanon was on its way to become just such a place until Arafat's terrorists, Hezbollah and  Syrian "peacekeepers" destroyed the "Switzerland of the Levant" as an example of what the Arabs are capable of building, just as the Baath thugs put paid to economic growth in Syria that averaged 7% for nearly two decades before their takeover.

As for Prof. Haddad, I find his rants about racism and anti-Israeli histrionics unworthy of response, though, in fairness, I do agree with him that we should re-consider our support for oppressive regimes such as the ones in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, I believe that Riyadh's aggressive ideological and financial support for Islamic extremism is a major cause of our problems with terrorism and we're unlikely to make serious headway in containing terrorism worldwide until we fess up to this fact.

I do, however, want to address Mr. Haddad's not so subtle accusation of racism as being behind the U.S. concern of WMDs in the hands of regimes like the Syrian, while disregarding Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. Evidently, Mr. Haddad's own prejudices have blinded him to the logic behind this attitude. Whether Israel has 200 or 2000 nuclear weapons is irrelevant and of no concern to most Americans, because they know that Israel is a democracy and extremely unlikely to use these weapons against them, while even a single WMD in the hands of unsavory regimes with a proven record  of support for terrorism like the Syrian one is and should be a major cause for concern. For the same reason, we are not very worried because France and Great Britain, and, for that matter, India, have nuclear weapons and have ceased to be concerned about Russia's huge arsenal once that country dumped its totalitarian system. To allow the likes of Saddam, Osama bin Laden and, yes, Bashar Al-Assad, to acquire WMD, on the other hand, is to guarantee a tragedy much greater than 9/11. No responsible American leader will allow that.

Boms: First, I do not think that a scale of optimism vs. pessimism is appropriate here (although I will admit that I rather have a sense of optimism if it can help conceive some hope and vision rather than a sense of pessimism that may lead to further devastation and negativism). The current situation in Iraq is far from being encouraging and as any reality it also point at mistakes and failures.   But the current wave of terror and violence is far from being the entire Iraqi story. We already know that the wave of violence is limited in its geographic scope and that despite constant attacks against Americans and against the U.N, ordinary Iraqis are able to maintain secure and undisturbed life in the majority of the country. We also know that the Iraqis are advancing quickly toward taking additional responsibilities in their country  and that they already they have about 50,000 police officers,  a beginning of an army and a large majority of cities that are governed by consensualy selected councils. True  we will not be able to see the results of this progress as long as Iraq continues to be unstable  but this means that we have more work to do and not that we need to appease those who try to undermine these efforts. Appeasing and pulling out will not help to secure a safer America or safer Iraq.

Second, I’ll agree with Mr. Haddad that foreign policy should be evaluated when it comes to countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and even Israel. But I am not sure how the strategy of “pulling out” will help reach any objective that has to do with stabilizing the region. Was the region more stable before Egypt and Jordan advanced toward peace and moderation? Would he prefer a less vigilant U.S that is less interested in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Afghanistan  like it was just over two years ago?  And should we have no right to protest against the occupation of Lebanon? Or against the backup given to groups such as the Hizballah who are committed to destroy everything we are trying to build?

Third, although American Foreign Policy may be inconsistent at times, I believe it still lays of some firm principles  one of, which is the lack of tolerance for those who fund, cheer and support terrorists who kill civilians for political purposes. One can say many things about Israel -  but unlike some of it’s neighbours, it is involved in none of the above. 

Last, aren’t we talking on Syria?

Interlocutor: Thanks Mr. Boms. Let's try to focus on Syria. In order for us to gauge what we need to do with Syria, however, we have to first crystallize our Iraq situation. So let me ask this: have we become stuck in a Vietnam-type predicament in Iraq? What lessons from Vietnam must we focus on in order to be successful in Iraq -- and, therefore, in our policy toward Syria? Prof. Haddad?

Haddad: Besides the fact that the question assumes we have been appointed by god or some deity as the world’s patriarch who must keep other countries in line in an unprincipled manner, the Iraq-type predicament seems much worse than that of Vietnam. Minimally, in Vietnam, the U.S. administration had some definable/stated goal, presumably to stem the tide of Communism (however that turned out). In Iraq, there have been several stated goals, none of which is credible, then or in retrospect: e.g., Saddam’s link to terrorism (specifically that of September 11, 2001), the continued existence of weapons of mass destruction, or the promotion of democracy.

The only credible pretext is that which was not stated: that a dictator and a former ally is no longer cooperating with the U.S. on material and geo-strategic issues. For Egypt is a dictatorship, Israel possesses at least 200 nuclear heads, and the highjackers are primarily from Saudi Arabia and Egypt (and most of the Taliban and Al-Qa`ida are in Pakistan): all these countries were either close allies or friends of the U.S. administration at the time of the invasion of Iraq. Little wonder that the U.S., or 60-65% of its population, is nearly alone in this world on this one. It is as though our politicians and most of our media outlets live in caves that are deeper and darker than those from which we were supposed to smoke out Al-Qa`ida.  

Kaiser:  I think it's fair to say that six months ago, some high officials of the Administration thought that by this time we would be involved in a new confrontation designed to bring down the government of North Korea, Iran, or Syria. Events since then have put matters in a different light.

To begin with, our experience in Iraq shows that, while no one will prevail against us (or even face us for very long) in a conventional battle any more, we simply lack the forces to impose order in a country of that size.  Having embarked on an almost unilateral policy, we cannot expect much financial help, much less bodies, from the rest of the world.  We have created anarchy, not pro-western security, in much of Iraq, and we have no effective strategy to stop it as yet.

Even if things do turn around in Iraq, however, we clearly do NOT have the forces to embark on any further such adventures for as long as we maintain 130,000 men there (indeed, we will not even be able to do that, apparently, for more than six more months.)  We are in danger of doing serious damage to the all-volunteer force and its reserves--just as Vietnam wrecked the much larger draftee army.

In short, any decision on Syria must start with our inability to replace the current regime with one more to our liking--and, perhaps, with the beginnings of a shift towards a policy of containment towards hostile Islamic regimes--one which, like the policy of containing Communism, will see us win some, lose some, and survive.

Interlocutor: Mr. Alexiev, what do you think of the comments made by Prof. Haddad and Prof. Kaiser?

Alexiev: Jamie, I am at a loss where to start in responding to the statements of Messrs. Kaiser and Haddad since, in my view, they're so strikingly unrelated to the reality they purport to describe. Perhaps, I should note the one area in which I'm in agreement with what's been said and that is Mr. Kaiser's remark that it is unrealistic to expect any military action to be contemplated with regards to Syria before the Iraqi situation is stabilized. With 140,000 U.S. troops tied in Iraq and another 35,000 supporting them elsewhere in the Gulf, a war with Syria is indeed out of the question for the foreseeable future. It is because of this that I had hoped that this forum will focus on what policies by the United States and the international community offer the best hope of steering Syria toward the desperately needed domestic reforms and a less confrontational foreign policy.

Instead what we have is some old and tired clichés of the Left on Iraq that, one would have thought, contribute little to a serious discussion of Syria. To wit, Mr. Kaiser opines that "we have created anarchy in much of Iraq and we have no effective strategy to stop it yet," while Mr. Haddad sees our predicament in Iraq as "much worse than Vietnam" and proceeds to discover the real reason for America's involvement in Iraq: "The only credible pretext is that which was not stated. That a dictator and a former ally is no longer cooperating with the U.S…." And both of them maintain the fiction that the U.S. is alone in the world in pursuing its Iraqi adventures and so on and so forth.

Much of this is rank nonsense, but it must be answered if one were to maintain even the appearance of intelligent discourse in this forum. To start with the anarchy bit, terrorist actions by Saddam's dead-enders and assorted jihadists notwithstanding, most of Iraq is fairly peaceful and making rapid strides toward the kind of civil society no other Arab country currently has. 160 new newspapers already provide a diversity of views that the Middle East has long not seen and city governments, courts and jails already function according to new civilized norms.  70,000 Iraqi policemen, a new civil defense force and an Iraqi army of 40,000 will take over many security functions by the end of the year, while the much-maligned Governing Council and the government it has appointed already are the only political bodies in Iraqi history that are truly representative of the nation's ethnic and religious make up. Unnoticed by the media, a set of economic reforms have just been announced which, when introduced, will transform Iraq into the first genuine market economy in the region.

As for the Vietnam comparison, suffice it to say that the war there cost America 12% of GDP yearly and 25 dead every day for eight long years, while the $87 billion the administration has requested for Iraq for next year amounts to less than 1% of GDP and our casualties at less than one per day, though tragic for the families involved, are negligible. The argument about America being alone in the struggle for a democratic Iraq is similarly unserious. It is being made as Spain has just taken over security in Najaf, the Bulgarians in Karbala, the Poles control a large swath of the country and the Japanese are sending a thousand troops to name just a few.

None of this is to say that there are no problems and mistakes have not been made. Clearly the cost of reconstruction, the vulnerability of the infrastructure and the potential of sabotage and terrorist activities sponsored by Baath diehards and neighboring countries were underestimated and policies and tactics had to be adjusted and lessons learned. Mistakes will be made in the future as well and constructive criticism has a role to play. But in the final analysis the only arbiter as to whether the war was justified or not are the Iraqi people. And all three polls conducted recently in Iraq show that huge majorities want the Americans and their allies to stay in Iraq. Perhaps the Iraqis know something Messrs. Kaiser and Haddad do not.

Interlocutor: Mr. Boms?

Boms: In response to Haddad, I would say: granted, at this moment it is easier to point on failures rather than on successes. Still, I will take issue with Haddad’s assertion about “several stated goals, none of which is credible”. In March of this year, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was asked about the objectives of this war. He noted that “As in Afghanistan, our objective in Iraq is not conquest or colonization. Iraq belongs to the Iraqi people. Our objective is to bring down a regime that threatens the American people with weapons of mass destruction and create conditions where Iraqis can establish a new government, one that respects the rights of its diverse population and the aspirations of all Iraqis to live in freedom and to choose their own leaders.”

On this ground, one needs to look at the Iraqi reality. As the news of the day focus on  the atrocities of terrorism in Iraq, we are often distracted from noticing the progress that was made on the Iraqi ground. We fail to see the improvements in infrastructure, the communication and water systems, the plans for urban and national development and - most importantly, the emergence of an Iraqi democratic government. We fail to see the life that exist beyond the troubled areas of the Sunni Triangle, where Iraqi men and women experience freedom for the first time in their lives. Surely, mistakes were made. But, restructuring takes time. It took the United Nation 7 years to implement, resolution 1035, restructuring Bosnia and Herzegovina.  It took the U.N 3 years in East Timor, populated with merely 600,000 people (compared with 24 million in Iraq). Change takes time. But a successful change in Iraq is a key for other positive development in the region. Be certain that Syria, who has doubled its trade with Iraq in the last few months, will pay close attention to the events across the boarder

Haddad: Let me put some claims to rest by descending from the sand palaces erected therein all the way to the ground, to the reality (in Iraq) that Mr. Alexiev purports to represent from behind a neat desk. Mr. Alexiev claims that Iraqis are the only arbiters regarding the war, and then alludes to “polls” conducted recently that reflect their desire for “the Americans and their allies to stay.” I’m not sure where Mr. Alexiev is getting his news, whether it is Fox, Al-Jazeera, or BBC, or others, but there’s much Fox in his writing and a lot less BBC or anything else.

I, and a group of colleagues, were dissatisfied with nearly all reporting on Iraq (including much of “Arab” satellite stations), so we actually went to Baghdad this past July to do field research and shoot a documentary precisely on the question of “what Iraqis think about the current situation.” we spoke to hundreds of people from all walks of life, rich and poor, leftists, rightists, and Islamists, men and women, intellectuals, writers, artists, business people, workers, peasants, and professionals, those who support the U.S., those who support Saddam, those who support the Islamists, and those who oppose the latter three.

We found that, primarily, Iraqis have been exhausted and literally traumatized by decades of oppression, three wars, 10 years of the most devastating sanctions, and now occupation, so much so that, by and large, they were initially willing, tongue-in-cheek, to give even the U.S. a chance to do good on its promises, despite the fact that they are aware that the U.S. supported Saddam in the 1980s, was quiet vis-à-vis his gassing of the Kurds in 1987, is primarily responsible for enforcing the devastating sanctions, and has its own oil and strategic interests in Iraq. But two months after the end of the war, at least four things had become increasingly clear to most Iraqis, and to us:

[1] that the acquiescence of segments of the population towards the Americans was more a function of their happiness at the removal of Saddam and their “temporary” state of helplessness and disarray.

[2] that most Iraqis, including the segments delineated above, are essentially strongly opposed to both Saddam and the U.S. (government, not people), and most will only support the Islamists in their resistance of occupation, but NOT in their plans to impose any kind of Islamic/theocratic rule (just as is the case with the Lebanese vis-à-vis Hizballah and the Palestinians vis-à-vis Hamas).

[3] that whereas the overwhelming majority of Iraqis are ecstatic at the removal of Saddam, they are experiencing some serious hardships in their day to day lives in areas related to security, water, electricity, infrastructure, communications, and (un)employment. So much so that, as time goes by, many are joining the resistance to occupation in subtle and not so subtle ways, especially those who are a) without jobs, b) have little to lose by way of assets, and c) have no savings or a family that depends on them. This translates into increasingly larger segments of the population.  

[4] that the U.S. does not intend, or perhaps cannot, deliver on promises of democracy, economic prosperity, and, of course, security. Hence the increasing resistance that is likely to become more widespread unless the U.S. Radically changes its behaviors and begins the process of shifting authority and sovereignty to Iraqis. The interim Council is a case in point: it is viewed as alien, sectarian, subordinate, and ineffectual. Alien because it is made up significantly of expatriates, sectarian because it is based on sect not any form of competence/merit, subordinate because it must answer to the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority), and ineffectual because it has no teeth, no real power. The idea for most Iraqis is that the U.S. knows that a representative government would vote to kick the U.S. out very soon. Economically, the U.S. Has the biggest contracts for rebuilding and is benefiting non-Iraqi subsidiaries, and, in any case, is seeking to privatize much of the economy, leaving the disadvantaged (most Iraqis at this point) behind. In terms of security, Iraqis know that the Americans can’t even protect themselves and are therefore unable to protect other organizations (e.g., U.N.) or Iraqis in general.

I wish Mr. Alexiev and others cared about what Iraqis thought when our current Defense Minister was shaking hands with their brutal dictator in 1983, when we were silent vis-à-vis Saddam’s use of nerve gas for which we partly provided the technology, when we enforced 10 years of devastating sanctions that weakened and killed them and strengthened their dictator. So conveniently, now we care about what the “natives” think. I wonder, does Mr. Alexiev care whether Syrians would think a war against Syria justifiable? Or should we only care retrospectively there too?

Kaiser: Gentlemen, let me get back for a moment to the Vietnam comparison. Although the situation in South Vietnam was very different--for one thing, both the enemy, the United States, and the United States' Vietnamese allies were FAR stronger than any of the corresonding entities in Iraq--it provides a useful basis for comparison.  Let's take the South Vietnamese election of 1967, in which Thieu won about a third of the vote and a peace candidate came in second.  2/3 of the South Vietnamese people, in short, were not supporting what we were trying to do. While doubtless Iraqis long for a better life, even our own picked INC is calling more often and more loudly for us to yield authority soon. I do not believe we have any plans to field 40,000 policemen and a 70,000-man army within three months, either, as Mr. Alexiev says. Perhaps by the end of 2004.  And this is not a tired, left-wing mantra, it's my attempt to make sense of all the news about Iraq that I can find.  Reality, not the Left, is the threat to the Administration's vision of a democratic, pro-American Middle East.  The Iraqi armed opposition is, if anything, growing.  It carries out most of its attacks without suffering any casualties, and the population doesn't seem to be warning Americans about the mines that it plants. None of this is encouraging.

Alexiev: Unfortunately, so far I see no discussion of Syria. I joined this debate because I hoped that we could have an enlightened debate on the direction Syria is likely to take having lost a key support system with the fall of Saddam. Would it finally reform its ossified political and economic system and seek an accommodation with the new realities in the Middle East, or would it choose continued confrontation as Tehran's new client state with potentially dire consequences? It wasn't to be. Perhaps we need a forum on Iraq so we can talk about Syria.

So here we go again on Iraq. Mr. Haddad questions my reference to recent polls in Iraq. I'd recommend that he checks the last Zogby poll in August which tells us that 70% of Iraqis expect to live better in five years and three-quarters want the Americans to stay at least another year. Instead, he tells us of his own fact-finding trip in Iraq in July.  Sitting "behind my neat desk," a description my wife would violently disagree with, and reading about his findings I had an uncomfortable sense of deja vue. Deja vue of a time many moons ago when as a young graduate student at UCLA I read a book by Paul Hollander called "Political Pilgrims" It was a book about American leftist luminaries who went to the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s to see the proletarian paradise first hand. And see it they did and reported glowingly on it after returning to the capitalist swamp. This at a time when Stalin's genocidal fury was running at a fevered pitch, eventually to consume the lives of over 20 million people.
 
Mr. Haddad wanted to see how much the Iraqi people hated the U.S., how motivated they were to resist it and that's what he tells us he saw. What he found, predictably, was that most Iraqis hate both Saddam and the Americans, that they support the Islamists, that many are joining the resistance and, of course, that the U.S. has no intention to deliver on its numerous promises. Proof there is none, but, of course, none is required in political pilgrimages.

Mr. Kaiser, on the other hand, insists on his preposterous Vietnam analogy, about which I have said enough already. He also says, however, that my figures for the Iraqi police and army are wrong and that I cannot pass up. If he does indeed try to get the best information he can, as he assured us in a previous post, he would know that we already  have 40,000 Iraqi police deployed in the country with a planned expansion to 70,000 by the end of this year and that a 40000 strong Iraqi military force is now being trained and will be fielded before the year is over. This quite apart from nearly 20000 already existing Iraqi security guards, border police and civil defense units.

I also do not expect my debate partners to believe that the U.S. is further planning to spend $20 billion to modernize Iraq's infrastructure and build virtually from scratch a civil society there. Or that this is 66 times more on a per capita basis than what we spent doing the same thing in Germany in 1948. They have too much vested in wishful thinking to be able to see the objective reality. But it is a reality that the people of Syria and the Middle East will not fail to see and that's the only thing that really counts.

Boms: At the end of it, I think we may agree on more than I suspected.

[1] The reality in Iraq is stronger than any philosophical or policy-based assertion. It demands responses that will most likely results in reevaluating and changing of tactics and policies. In many ways, it already did.

[2] There are people who do not like our presence in Iraq - but we should put this, as Haddad suggests, in an appropriate perspective as well. The vast majority of this resistance comes from a segment of the population that consists of only 15% of Iraq's population. The Iraqi Sunni's have a good reason to be angry since they have just lost the power and control they used to have. They  would like to have this power back in their hands and are presently willing to destroy Iraq in the process. For sure, we should not let this happen.

[3] I believe that we have significantly narrowed the American - European divide over the some of the most significant questions regarding Iraq. We agree that the build-up of local and national governance structure is crucial and that the transfer of power should happen sooner rather then later. We agree that it will take more than America alone to win this battle.  We agree that the Iraqis need to take the responsibilities associated with running their country. We disagree on some of the management tactics, about the role of the different partners in carrying this task and about the time sequence of this process.  This is, mind you, a tactical disagreement - not a strategic one. Off course, there are good reasons for these disagreements, but this is a topic for another panel.

[4] We need to be cautions when we speak about the vision of  " democratic, pro-American Middle East". First and foremost, we would like to see a safer Middle East - free from deadly weapons that can reach to the hands of those who care little about the lives of others. Democracy has proven itself to be a useful vehicle for cultivating such reality in a good number of places so far. However, nation building is not genetic cloning. We should not be in the business of exporting but in the business of consulting - and we should do that with a good degree of humility and honor.

[5] As far as Syria is concerned - I believe no one is naïve enough to think that a simple move that will cause Mr. Assad to evaporate from the face of this planet will do the trick. The reality is more sophisticated - and those who practice and implement policies appear to understand this. We can't simply force our way of lives of others - but we are obliged to act when states and individuals are acting in a way that threatens our lives. We must work with our allies - and we have allies in the Middle East in Iraq and even in Syria - to help secure the region and work toward what every American has already taken for granted, the right to pursuer liberty and happiness.

Interlocutor: Bassam Haddad, David Kaiser, Nir Boms and Alex Alexiev, our time is up. It was an honor to have you all on this edition of Frontpage Symposium. We hope you will join us again soon. Take care for now.

I welcome all of our readers to get in touch with me if they have a good idea for a symposium. Email me at jglazov@rogers.com.