The recent bombings in Iraq indicate that a global Jihad is now being waged against the United States -- with its focal point in Iraq. What exactly is the nature of this new threat? Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? What policy must the U.S. pursue to defend itself and, ultimately, to achieve victory?

To discuss these and other questions related to the Jihad in Iraq, Frontpage Symposium is joined today by Michael Ledeen, a Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and the author of the new book The War Against the Terror Masters; Cliff May, President of the anti-terrorism think tank Foundation For the Defense of Democracies; Charles Kupchan. a professor at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century; and Daniel Brumberg, an Associate Professor of Government at Georgetown University, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and author of Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran.

Interlocutor: Gentlemen, welcome to Frontpage Symposium. A few days ago a car loaded with explosives blew up  outside Baghdad's police headquarters.  A few days before that, a truck bombing occurred outside the Sheik Ali Mosque in Najaf. Add to that the bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad. All of these events, I think we can agree, are an ominous sign that the Jihad being waged against the U.S. is now centered in Iraq. What is the nature of this new threat?

Ledeen: I wrote the first edition of "The War Against the Terror Masters" a year before the start of the war in Iraq, and in it I said that Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia could not tolerate an American success in Iraq, and would send terrorists, assassins, kidnapers and the like against us.  Their goal would be to repeat what they believe to have been their great success in Lebanon against us in the 80s and against Israel in the 90s.

So this was obviously going to happen, it was clear a long time ago, and indeed they told us they were going to do it.  Bashar Assad gave an interview shortly after the start of the war in which he said explicitly that "Lebanon was the model" for their strategy.

May: Barham Saleh, the Iraqi Kurdish prime minister said it best: "Iraq is the nexus where many issues are coming together -- Islam versus democracy, the West versus the axis of evil, Arab nationalism versus some different types of political culture. If the Americans succeed here, this will be a monumental blow to everything the terrorists stand for."  

But I’m not sure I agree that it is ominous that the Jihad is now centering in Iraq. Were these Jihadists not coming to Iraq, they’d be going somewhere else to wage war against America. Is it not better to have them facing 101^st Airborne in Tikrit, rather than crossing the Canadian and Mexican borders in search of shopping malls to suicide-bomb? It’s not as if these terrorists -- were they not coming to Iraq -- would be enrolling in hotel management schools in Karachi, and watching over the progress of their 401k’s.

The Jihadists have declared war on America. They have committed acts of war against America. Now we have to fight and win this war – we have no other choice. We can not make ourselves inoffensive to the Jihadists. And winning this war means, among other things, depriving the Jihadists of territory, toppling what Dr. Ladeen calls the “terrorist masters” (such as Saddam Hussein), attempting to create civilized societies in former despotisms such as Iraq, and destroying the Jihadist terrorists wherever we find them and wherever they find us.

Kupchan: Islamic militants are apparently taking advantage of Iraq's porous borders, heading to a place where U.S. targets are relatively easy to access. The fact that other targets -- the UN, mosques, oil pipelines -- are also being hit suggests that the US may have its hands full trying to establish order and basic services.  Despite what the generals are telling us from Bahgdad, I think more troops are needed -- and fast. 

If not US troops, then it is time to get to the UN for a broader mandate. Although I would agree with May and Ledeen that the US must stay the course and prevail against its opponents in Iraq, I think it a bit illusory to maintain -- as I believe Thomas Friedman did in an column recently -- that winning is Iraq is the key to ensuring positive change in the Middle East.  Yes, we need to stay the course in Iraq.  But let's not buy into domino theory and overstate the case.  Bringing stability to the Middle East will take generations, country by country.  Better hunker down for the long haul.  Let's hope that Iraq does not scare away America from the broader goal. 

Brumberg: There are two related problems here, first there is the question of the Jihadists, the vast majority of whom are Sunnis, and then there is the question of the Sunni community of Iraq. The US made the mistake of conflating the Sunni population with Baathists and Saddamites, thus signalling the Sunnis that they would be the losers in any post Saddam Iraq. Bremer has tried to reverse this policy (which he first contributed to), but there is much fear in the Sunni population and thus a readiness to back the Jihadists.

As for the Jihadists, they would be wrong to assume that the fight they are waging now is analogous to the fight they waged in Soviet occupied Afghanistan. The majority of Iraq is Kurd and Shiites. Moreover, most Shiites still support the US. Sadr and his "Mahdi brigade" represent a small, well organized and thus very dangerous challenge, but they have not won over the Shiites majority, not yet at any rate. Iran's clerics support competing Shiites leaders. Indeed one faction is supporting the Hakim family, whose leaders sit in the Governing Council. But Iran could do a lot of damage if it chose, in one coherent policy, to back Sadr and his followers.

As for Syria, it badly miscalculated by allowing Jihadists across its borders, but now seems to be more or less cooperating. So, if we can some how gain control of the borders, we can lessen the flow of Jihadists into Iraq. Then if basic services can be restored, (thus reducing the influence of Sadr types, which derives in part from their control over social services, provision of security etc...), we can begin to turn the situation around. But, none of this is possible without some kind of internationalization of the reconstruction process in Iraq. My sense is that Bush and his advisors will come to terms with this challenge, despite the ideological challenges.

May:  A “domino theory” for democracy in the Middle East is too much to hope for. But democratization of the Arab world must start somewhere, at sometime. We are now committed to helping assist the millions of Iraqis who want their country to become decent, free, democratic and prosperous. There’s no guarantee this effort will succeed. But there is a chance. And if we do succeed, that success will have a profound impact on the Arab and Islamic worlds.

But Mr. Kupchan is correct to suggest that if we fail, we are unlikely to make a similar attempt for a long time to come.

I’m not sure Mr. Brumberg is correct to charge that the administration confused Sunnis with Ba’athists. Moreover, it has to be clear to the Sunnis that, in a democratic Iraq, they will be a minority and no longer entitled to rule over their Shia and Kurd neighbors. While some Sunnis accept that, others have to be expected to resist it.

I’d argue that we should think hard before we seek to “lessen the flow of Jihadists into Iraq.” Rather we should encourage them to come (“bring it on”), track them as they enter Iraq and destroy them along the desert roads. After all, if these Jihadists don’t come to Iraq what are the chances they will return to such home towns as Riyadh, Karachi and Ramallah to set up accounting practices or teach aerobics? These Jihadists are committed to killing infidels. We should want them to come out and fight our highly-trained and skilled combat forces. We should not want them to return to the mountain reaches of Pakistan and Afghanistan to plan terrorist attacks on American office buildings.

The Bush administration may be moving toward enlisting increased international involvement. I think that’s mainly because the political advisors see a steep political cost to be paid for not having UN and other international participation. That’s become a top talking point of the administration’s critics. But I see no reason to believe that the UN can be of much help with the key tasks – defeating the terrorists and guerrillas and helping build democratic institutions.

Ledeen: Yes, as Daniel says, Syria is easier to intimidate than Iran, but the Syrians will help the terrorists as much as they can.  I also agree that we will eventually win, but that requires the liberation of Iran, at a minimum.  And I am sure we will get there, because there is really no way to escape.  They have declared war on us, and our only choices are to win or to lose.  "Internationalizing" the Iraqi battlefield won't help; it will only diversify the dead.

This really is a war of freedom against tyranny.  The Iranians and the Saudis fully understand this (I'm not so sure about the Syrians), and I think President Bush understands it too, in exactly those terms.  Alas, it does not seem that Secretary of State Powell sees it that way, and he keeps convincing himself that with only a bit more time, and bit more effort, we can settle this like gentlemen.

I wish he were right, but I don't think so.  At the end of the Gulf War, we left Saddam in power, to our great regret.  If we try to leave the mullahs and the sheikhs in power this time, it will be terrible.

Brumberg: The US does not have the means to affect regime change in Iran short of a full-scale military attack, and that is not going to happen, nor should it. The gap between the administration's rhetoric (which is not as extreme as that of Dr. Ledeen's) and political reality is huge. As I have noted, the notion that Iran's clerical establishment is about to fall, and/or that popular disgust with the regime is organized in a way that can threaten it, is misleading. We have a confusion between advocacy and analysis, between the way the world is and the way we want it to be. So the analysis is designed to abet the strategy, not the other way around.

Washington is full of this kind of inverted thinking these days. Regarding the internationalization of the war in Iraq (the war is not over, not withstanding Bush's declaration on the air craft carrier), judging by recent reports, and keeping in mind the logic of our current predicament, it seems that the Bush administration has concluded that some kind of modification of our approach is necessary, and that our own capacity to work with Iraqis will require a solution that allows the UN a bigger role. One can debate how that will be done, but one way or another it will happen, especially if we really want to win in the end.

Interlocutor: So postwar Iraq is now clearly a magnet for terrorists bent on attacking the United States. Who are our supporters and enemies in this new specific context? Are there some “allies” that are actually our foes?

Kupchan: The United States faces enormous challenges in Iraq. There are the direct enemies -- the remnants of the Baath regime and various militant groups in Iraq, some home-grown, some coming across the borders from outside.  The broader Iraqi population is up for grabs.  They certainly want basic services restored and a functioning state.  But more could turn against the US if chaos prevails.  Since the Bush team is reluctant to raise US troops levels as required, they should immediately seek help from allies -- Europeans, Indians, others -- and pass the necessary resolutions at the UN.  Otherwise, Iraq could turn into a fiasco.

Brumberg: Well, these are difficult questions to answer given the paucity of good intelligence and the chaos in parts of Iraq. My sense is that several groups have taken advantage of this chaos to advance their "cause." These would include Islamist terrorist groups affiliated with Al Qaeda (some of which are linked to or working with Saddam's Fedayeen), Ansar i-Islam, many of whose members fled to Iran after the US attacked their camps, but according to reports, are now returning, Hizbollah, coming into Iraq from Lebanon through Syria, and the new paramilitary force known as Al-Mahdi, which is linked to Maqtadar Sadr and his supporters in the Shiite community. The latter group molds its ideology and program on the legacy of Mohammed Baqir is Sadr, and to some extent Khomeini.

Iran, or certainly some elements in Iran, seem to be supporting Shiite radical groups, some of which may be responsible for the recent attack on the Hakim family, whose leader is supporting the American backed Governing Council. I think the Hakim family can still be counted on as supporters, despite their links to Iran. Our essential problem in Iraq is with the Sunni community, most of whose members were not necessarily die-hard supporters of Saddam Hussein, but the vast majority of whom fear a Shiíte dominated Iraq.

The Bush administration, and Bremer in particular, fed these fears initially by putting, or seeming to put, all Sunnis in one camp, conflating Saddamites, Ba'thists and Sunnis. Obviously the Kurds remain key supporters in our effort to fight against terrorism.

Finally, apart from the issue of terrorism, my sense is that we should expect to see the revival of and even active participation of certain "fundamentalist" groups in Iraq, such as the Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brethren. This group would not necessarily support terrorism, indeed it might condemn it, but its rhetoric will be anti American, anti Israeli and quite possibly anti-Semitic. But in the context of a new "democratic" Iraq such groups will emerge as players in the political arena. Finally, I might also add that Iran is planning to send an ambassador to Baghdad. It will be interesting to watch how the revival of Iraqi-Iranian relations plays out in light of US-Iranian relations, and in light of the American role in Iraq.

May:  The Bush administration is eager for foreign support – but reluctant to pass “the necessary resolutions at the UN” to obtain it. That’s wise.

As the price of their support, the UN and the Europeans (the French in particular) are demanding that the US cede authority.  To agree to that would be the quickest way to turn Iraq in to a fiasco.

First, it would violate the need for “unity of command.” Would you really want a US general palavering with a Fijian general over how best to respond to a suicide bombing? More broadly, whoever has responsibility for the outcome in Iraq also must have the authority. Do you think UN Secretary General Kofi Annan is seriously proposing to share the responsibility for what happens? Do you think the media and international community will blame Mr. Annan equally with President Bush if Iraq does become a fiasco? Would you want Mr. Annan deciding which Ba’athists are sufficiently reformed that they should be welcomed into a new Iraqi government.?

Finally, the widespread notion that the problem in Iraq is too few boots on the ground deserves examination. Suppose you have a neighbourhood in which Ba’athist bitter-enders and foreign jihadis and known to be plotting attacks. Suppose that currently there is one US soldier patrolling that neighbourhood. Is he solving the problem? No, in essence, he’s offering himself up as a target. OK, so what happens if you could assign another 10 soldiers – American or Indian or French -- to that neighbourhood? Would that do the trick? No, those soldiers would still be out on the street, offering up more potential targets while the plotters continued to safely plot over their hummus and kabobs.

If more troops are not the answer, what is? Better intelligence. What you really need are Iraqi assets who can find out in which houses and mosques the plotters are plotting. Then you want clandestine operatives using electronic eavesdropping devices to hear what they’re saying about hidden weapons and allied terrorists in other locations. Then you want well-trained troops surrounding the plotters, demanding they come out with their hands up, and firing missiles at them if they refuse.

All of which suggests that the answer to current problems is not (1) doing whatever it takes to get UN and European troops in Iraq, nor is it (2) raising troop levels.

Ledeen:  As I wrote in "The War Against the Terror Masters," Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia cannot tolerate an American success in Iraq (or Afghanistan, where things are also heating up).  They are therefore supporting a terror war against us, hoping to repeat their success in Lebanon in the eighties and nineties.  The Iranians are the driving force behind this, since they are the biggest by far of the three countries, and have the most experience in ruining terrorist groups.  I think that the recent bombings have been organized by Imad Mughniyah, the infamous operational chieftain of Hizbollah, in league with the groups mentioned by Charles and Daniel.

The best way to think of the terror network nowadays is as a galaxy, not as separate organizations.  It's like the mafia families in "The Godfather," they have united in a war plan against us.  But the bulk of the guidance comes from Tehran, where most of the terror leaders have been hiding and working in preparation for this campaign in Iraq.

Questions like "who are our allies in Iraq?" are a bit beside the main point, frankly.  There will never be peace in Iraq until the mullahs are brought down in Iran, and that requires us--and any other civilized country that understands the stakes--to support the Iranian people in their efforts to change the regime in Tehran and become free.

Brumberg: On the question of the UN, I have spent hours with people from the Pentagon and the international NGO humanitarian community in joint meetings, and the message has been loud and clear: the humanitarian crisis that emerged in Iraq in April and May would have been far less severe had the UN been brought in from the very start, and had the UN coordinated its activities with the US military. What the latter lacked was a communications system that would have allowed the US military to communicate with NGO activists and UN activists so that news of a crisis in this or that hospital, this or that water system, etc., could have been systematically and quickly distributed to all relevant parties.

The UN has THE MOST effective communications system for this kind action, the American military was unable (and sometimes unwilling) to make use of it, or to link up to it in any effective way. Everyone I have talked to agrees that this level of coordination was impossible because of: 1) the animosity between the UN and the Bush administration. 2) the level of force and technology integration in the American military itself, which made it hard (but NOT impossible) to create an effective means of coordination and communication. (This point was made strongly to Bremer during his recent briefings here in DC).

We have already paid a high price for our failure not merely to anticipate the humanitarian/security crisis, but for the tension and antagonism displayed towards the UN. As for the question of a military role for the UN, I don't think it's a matter of "ceding" authority: rather it is a question of negotiating a solution that would bring the international community in a manner that puts other military forces under US command, but still gives the commanders of these forces some role in coordinating strategy with the Americans. (This approached was adopted in Bosnia and elsewhere). What is getting in the way is not logistics, not strategy, it is ideology.

Finally, regarding Iran, the idea that Iran is the "driving force" behind the escalating attacks on the Americans, the UN and the Shi'ites is dubious. The murder of Muhammad Baqir Al Hakim was most likely a Fedayeen-Al Qa'eda joint venture. Al Hakim, had he survived, would have assured the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq and its followers a major position in any elected government. He would have advocated some kind of modified vision of Islamic government that would not only give clerics some kind of role in politics; it would have assured Iran influence in a post Saddam government.  

After all, Al Hakim had been classmate of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and was, by all reports, close to the hardliners. His main clerical competitor (and a man who was a genuine pluralist, which Al Hakim was not) was Abdel Majid al-Khoi, had been killed in April by the Sadriyun, who are more extreme than Al Hakim (but who, I believe, would not have dared assassinate Al Hakim). So we must look elsewhere than Iran for the MAIN source of the problem in Iraq. If democracy in Iraq has to wait for the fall of the mullahs in Iran, than we are in for a long wait. The notion that the mullahs are about to tumble is erroneous-- more a form of advocacy than analysis. Finally, I agree that more intelligence is required. But one look at the way the Bush administration has handled things suggests that this was sorely lacking from the start. 

Kupchan: I disagree with Cliff May about the UN. We can get a resolution through the UN that preserves unity of command and keeps at an American at the helm. There are plenty of examples of intervention forces operating under UN auspices but preserving a command structure comfortable to the US -- such as in Kosovo or Afghanistan.  Furthermore, we DO need more troops.  Sure, better intelligence will help.  But Iraq is coming apart at the seams.  We need to make regular Iraqis feel more secure and that their lives are improving -- otherwise they will turn against the occupation.  America is currently in a precarious predicament in Iraq. It desperately needs help.  Going to the UN, engaging the international community, is a must.  It would also bring added legitimacy to the operation in Iraq and to America -- both of which are sorely needed.

Ledeen: If the UN wants to send people in to Iraq, under any logistical set-up, that's fine with me, but they will be blown up by the terrorists just as they were in Baghdad in the Canal Hotel. I know people like Dan think I've confused my passions with my grey cells, but after all I am the only person who accurately predicted the terrorist assault, and I did it months before the liberation of Iraq.  So maybe I know something after all.  This is expanded in the new paperback edition of "The War Against the Terror Masters," should anyone care to look.

As for the assassination of Hakim, if that wasn't Imad Mughniyah, then it was a hell of a protege...Hakim was viewed as a traitor by Khamene'i, and was on an Iranian list of targets, including Jalal Talabani, Ahmad Chalabi and Hossein Khomeini. 

To repeat, I don't believe it makes sense to assign responsibility for any terrorist attack to one specific group, or even a joint venture.  There is now a terrorist galaxy, getting prime support from Iran and additional help from the Saudis and Syrians, and, more and more of late, the Libyans.  Those are the terror masters who have declared war on us.  They will not be mollified by UN persons in Iraq; they must drive out all the infidels and crusaders, otherwise they believe they are doomed themselves.

May: I’m unclear what “humanitarian crisis emerged in Iraq in April and May.” While it was widely predicted that U.S. intervention in Iraq would precipitate mass exoduses of refugees, widespread starvation, epidemics, Turkish intervention in Kurdistan, civil war and the like – none of that happened to the best of my knowledge.

To be sure, after decades of misrule and in the aftermath of a brief but intense conflict, there was and remains much work to be done to repair and refurbish Iraq’s water and power system and to improve its health care system. The US forces did a surprisingly poor job of setting up communications networks – not just with the NGOs but, more importantly, with average Iraqis who needed a reliable source of news and information.

As for getting through a UN resolution that preserves unity of command, the Administration appears now to be eagerly pursuing such a goal so I suppose we’ll see whether it can be accomplished without leading to the trap of giving up authority while retaining responsibility.

While it is in the interest of the administration’s critics (including those in the media) to promote the idea that the U.S. is in a “precarious predicament” and “desperately needs help,” I don’t happen to believe that’s the reality. Iraq is a difficult and dangerous place – as we knew it would be.  This also was the case in Germany post-World War II and in the South after the Civil War, to take just two examples. Back in May, did anyone seriously expect Iraq to be pacified, modernized and democratized by the end of summer?

As long ago as last March, Bashar Assad, Syria’s pro-Saddam, Ba’athist dictator, threatened to turn Iraq into another Lebanon (from which U.S. forces fled after suicide bombings exactly 20 years ago). Hezbollah (the terrorist organization responsible for those 1983 bombings) also has been calling on Islamic militants to target US forces in Iraq. So too, has al Qaeda and Wahhabi clerics in Saudi Arabia. Iran’s mullahs obviously don’t want a pro-American democracy on their doorstep.

Iraq, along with Afghanistan, has become the main theater in the global war against jihadist terrorism. That’s a tough situation but it may be preferable to the alternatives. Better to fight the jihadists in Baghdad than in Boston. It would be nice if the UN – and the French, Germans and Russians – would assist us in the war against terrorism but we shouldn’t count on that, no matter what we offer them in return.

Interlocutor: Well Gentlemen, we are out of time. Would you like to make a final comment on the Bush administration switching gears and now requesting the U.N. to transform the U.S.-led force in Iraq to a multinational force and to play a significant role in shaping post-Saddam Iraq. Is this good news?

Brumberg: Well, it is something of a gear switch, a consequence of domestic and foreign pressures, as well as the internal fight in the administration, which Powell, backed by the Pentagon brass, has won, at least for now. I imagine if the French and the Germans play their cards badly, they could one again humiliate Powell and thus once again undercut their own interests (early indications suggest that they may be doing just this -- but perhaps their initial reaction to Powell's proposal are a simply bargaining position).

In any case, at this point it is difficult to judge whether we are moving from over drive to second, or just for fourth. How much of a shift time will tell. I don't think this is merely a cosmetic plan, something to please Western European (WE) players while leaving all the "real" power in the hands of the US. Depending on how the UN resolution is worded, and depending on how cooperation on the ground evolves, it might lead to a real division of labor and some authority-- thus pulling the Western Europeans into a project that might allow for an eventual healing of the great rift between the US and WE. That is a good thing. What is clear now to everyone is that rebuilding Iraq requires international assistance, support and participation. Even if, as I suspect, the 60 billion dollar rebuilding cost estimated by the administration proves too modest, the signal sent by international cooperation to both the regional players in the Middle East, and the Fadeyeen/Islamist terrorists forces in Iraq, will be positive.

Kupchan: The move to go back to the UN is long overdue. And we are going back at time when our bargaining leverage is low -- the rest of the world knows that the U.S. vastly underestimated the challenge of pacifying post-war Iraq and desperately needs help.  But now is not the time for finger-pointing or "told-you-so" recriminations.  Rather, Europe must join with others to make sure that Iraq is stabilized and headed in the right direction.  Successful, pragmatic U.S.-European cooperation on Iraq may also help restore some equanimity to transatlantic relations.

May:  Iraq has been liberated. Because of that liberation, there is now an historic opportunity to help Iraqis build a decent, free and prosperous nation – the first democracy in the Arab world. It sure would be nice if the United Nations Security Council endorsed this project. It sure would be nice if the French, the Germans and others participated in it.

President Bush is asking them to do that. But if they are unwilling, or if they reply that the price of their cooperation is that they be given authority – while refusing to accept responsibility – I hope the President will walk away.

There are two key challenges in Iraq at this moment.

The first is to defeat the Ba’athist remnants and their Jihadist allies from abroad. The UN does not have the capability to do that. The UN doesn’t gather intelligence or deploy Special Forces or even crack combat troops. But Blue Helmets could relieve US, UK and other Coalition forces of the burden of guarding pipelines, museums, hospitals, schools and mosques. They could patrol Iraq’s porous borders. If troops from India and Fiji require the UN imprimatur to take on these tasks, that should be given to them. Indeed, there should be consequences if the UN withholds its approval.

The second key challenge is to begin to build democratic institutions in Iraq. The UN has no particular aptitude for that task. In fact, as an organization the UN does not prefer democracies over dictatorships. If it did, Syria would not be on the UN Security Council today, and Libya would not be heading the UN Human Rights Commission. So here, too, the Coalition must maintain authority, while opening the door for consultation with all those willing to assist.

A little more than half a century ago, Europe benefited enormously from the Marshall Plan, an American initiative that was both generous and enlightened. Now, the US is attempting put together what amounts to a Marshall Plan for Iraq. If it succeeds, the influence on the Arab and Islamic worlds could be profound. One would hope that the Europeans will not respond by saying, in effect: “The Marshall Plan of the 1940s helped us, so we were all for it. This Marshall Plan would help someone else, so why would we care? Call us when there’s some money to be made.” But that response can not yet be ruled out.

Finally, it’s vital to keep in mind what Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden believe about Westerners in general and Americans in particular. They believe that if they bloody our noses, we will run. They believe we don’t have the will or the stamina to wage a sustained conflict. They believe it’s only a matter of time before the unbelievers prove to be cowards who turn tail and run. There are those in the West who are encouraging such beliefs. It will be necessary to demonstrate that they represent only a small minority.

Interlocutor: Michael Ledeen, Cliff May, Dan Brumberg and Charles Kupchan, thank you for your time. It was a pleasure to have you on Frontpage Symposium. We'll see you again soon.