Highly-reliable sources indicate that the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has, since the beginning of October 2002, and possibly before, begun active efforts to acquire completed nuclear weapons.

It is known that Saudi officials had approached officials of the Government of Pakistan in this regard, on the basis that Saudi possession of such weapons would act as a deterrent to any possible Israeli threat of nuclear force against Saudi Arabia. The sources indicated that Saudi Arabia was not interested in acquiring nuclear weapons manufacturing capability, or weapons-grade raw material, but only in acquiring actual weapons, preferably for missile delivery using Saudi CSS-2 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) which had been acquired from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

It is believed that the Saudi officials had also approached one or more other states to assist in the provision of nuclear weapons, possibly including the PRC and/or the Democratic People’s Republic of [North] Korea (DPRK).

There is no indication that any of the states approached have hinted that they would consider the Saudi requests, although some of the negotiations have been ongoing, with several meetings taking place.

However, GIS sources also indicated that the Saudi premise in attempting to deter an Israeli nuclear threat was flawed, based on the fact that Israeli officials fundamentally agree that the continued stability of the House of Sa‘ud was the most preferred Israeli option for Saudi Arabia, and that Israel was anxious not to disturb the status quo in the Kingdom. The collapse of Saudi Arabia and its possible break-up and/or radicalization was an undesirable strategic outcome for Israel, unless the Saudi Hejaz region could be restored to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Hashemites — who were kings of Iraq and still are the Royal line of Jordan — were removed from their control of Mecca and Medina when the Hejaz was seized by the House of Sa‘ud in the 1919-1925 timeframe.

However, Israeli sources have made it clear that a Saudi acquisition of nuclear weapons, coupled with signs of either direct Saudi hostility toward Israel or the prospect of a collapse of the House of Sa‘ud in the Kingdom, would trigger pre-emptive military action by Israel against Saudi missile facilities.

[See Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, April 2, 2002: Israel Makes a Point of Highlighting Saudi Strategic Missile Facilities, quoted in full below]

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily noted in its April 2, 2002, report:

There was speculation in Jerusalem and, apparently, in Middle Eastern capitals on April 1, 2002, over reports leaked into the Israeli press on March 27, 2002, with extensive details of the Saudi Arabian CSS-2 ballistic missile facilities. Details of the facilities and the CSS-2 missiles — supplied by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1990 — were already well-known within the intelligence and defense communities of most interested countries. The question being raised by the latest reports was why attention should be focused at this time on the facilities.

The Israeli, Hebrew-language daily Yediot Aharonot reported on March 27, 2002, that the complex was built in the al-Sulayel desert about 500km south of Riyadh. The complex contains huge missile silos, residential areas and factories in King Khaled City. The newspaper published photographs from the Space Imaging Corporation’s Ikonos satellite of what was identified as two missile bases and a complex of 33 buildings, eight of them capable of storing CSS-2 ballistic missiles, which have a range of 2,500 to 3,500km, depending on payload. GIS sources believe that it is almost certain that the Saudis had — failing to obtain nuclear warheads — intended to deploy the systems with chemical and/or biological warheads.

Virtually no purpose would be served equipping the systems with conventional warheads, while chemical or biological warheads would be able to serve as a deterrent to — particularly — Iranian threats by targeting Iranian agricultural production.

Saudi Arabia had expanded the missile complex since 1995, when a French Spot Image satellite photographed the area. The Government had received deliveries of the CSS-2 in 1990 as part of a deal reportedly for as many as 120 missiles and 12 launchers.

King Khaled Military City is located near a Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) base where Panavia Tornado fighters were deployed. The RSAF reportedly controls the CSS-2 IRBMs, and maintains two bases for the systems at al-Joffer and al-Sulayel. The al-Sulayel site was given prominence in the Israeli reporting, which drew attention to the Ikonos satellite photographs of the facility located at coordinates lat. 20°43'07"N and long. 45°35'01"E. That is approximately 27km North of the desert oasis of al-Sulayel, and consists of a site support area and two launch areas located six kilometers apart. More than 33 permanent and 36 semi-permanent buildings were visible.

Only eight of the buildings were believed to have been large enough to accommodate the CSS-2.

Earlier, on March 4, 2002, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily reported that the Israeli Government had moved to develop an offensive capability "strategic triad" of missile forces, naval and air forces to project Israeli strategic power. This development specifically included the need for Israeli forces to consider the strategic weapons use of the Saudi ballistic missile capabilities.