On
January 24, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S.
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs held a
hearing on the activities of the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) in North Korea. A report issued by the subcommittee confirmed
findings by prior inquiries and audits that deficiencies in UNDP rules,
procedures, and management permitted North Korea to dictate the
composition of UNDP staff, access hard currency, and avoid standard
monitoring procedures for projects and financial transactions. Also,
the report expanded on previous findings by concluding that the North
Korean regime used a bank account that was reserved for U.N. activities
to secretly transfer funds to North Korean bank accounts in the United
States and Europe—and that the regime used the UNDP to facilitate
payments to a company that has ties to an entity involved in arms
dealing. Finally, the report found that “by preventing access to its
audits and not submitting to the jurisdiction of the UN Ethics Office,
UNDP impeded reasonable oversight and undermined its whistleblower
protections.[1]
These problems are serious and should lead Congress to reconsider its
willingness to fund UNDP activities absent fundamental improvements in
transparency and accountability.
Money Laundering and Mismanagement
Over
the past year, UNDP activities in North Korea have come under
increasing scrutiny. Several inquires and audits have revealed that
UNDP activities in North Korea were conducted in violation of UNDP
rules and procedures. Allegations of UNDP mismanagement and violations
of standard rules and procedures first arose when Artjon Shkurtaj—the
Operations Manager at UNDP in Pyongyang—blew the proverbial whistle on
the deficiencies in the UNDP’s operations. His actions led the U.S.
Mission to the United Nations to request access to UNDP audits and
other information related to the organization’s operations in North
Korea. The UNDP resisted U.S. inquiries, and the dispute eventually was
reported in the press. North Korea refused to cooperate with a request
from the UNDP Executive Board that it comply with an inquiry into the
suspect activities, which ultimately led to the suspension of UNDP
activities in North Korea in March 2007.[2]
A
U.N. audit later confirmed the information provided by Shkurtaj. It
also detailed several examples of UNDP mismanagement, including: the
staffing of UNDP’s office with North Korean nationals chosen by the
North Korean regime, the “skimming” of the salary payments to those
office workers by the North Korean government, and the use of
convertible currencies (such as the U.S. dollar and Euro) instead of
North Korean currency. All of these activities were in violation of
U.N. and UNDP standard operating procedures and basic “best practices.”[3]
The
confirmation of mismanagement did not protect Shkurtaj from retaliation
by UNDP, which refused to renew his employment contract. The U.N.
Ethics Office determined that Shkurtaj had made a valid case that he
had been retaliated against by UNDP.[4] UNDP, however, decided that the Ethics Office had no jurisdiction and declined to have the Ethics Office handle the issue.[5] Shkurtaj’s case remains pending before a review panel appointed by UNDP.
The
recent Senate report confirms the allegations made by Shkurtaj and the
conclusions of the UN audit. It also makes several additional and
disturbing findings about the relationship between the UNDP and North
Korea. For example, over a six-month period in 2002, North Korea used a
UNDP-related bank account to essentially “launder” $2.72 million out of
the country to fund its interests in the United States and Europe. The
North Koreans themselves admitted that these transfers were made
through the UNDP account in order to avoid international scrutiny. Even
on a good day, it is a difficult task for the U.S. Treasury Department
to track North Korean funding of illicit activities. North Korea’s use
of UNDP bank accounts to conduct international financial transactions
makes it even more difficult to “follow the money” out of North Korea.
Moreover, since the North Korean regime used its UNDP bank accounts as
a cover to transfer funds on at least one occasion, it is reasonable to
believe that it has done so on other occasions.
Most
disturbingly, the Senate report reveals that the North Korean regime
used UNDP to conduct financial transactions in connection with the
regime’s arms-trading activities. Specifically, UNDP facilitated the
payment of more than $50,000 to a company in Macau called Zang Lok,
which serves as North Korea’s financial agent for sales of ballistic
missiles, conventional arms, and related goods. Again, if North Korea
used UNDP in connection with its arms-dealing activities on one
occasion, it is likely that there are other as yet unknown transactions
of the same nature.
Considering these practices, UNDP arguments that UNDP funds were not diverted by North Korea are not credible.[6]
The opaque nature of North Korea finances and the government’s
propensity to pool resources from all sources into common accounts
makes it very likely that UNDP funds were used in an inappropriate
manner.
Unfortunately, the potential for
mismanagement of UNDP activities is not unique to North Korea. UNDP
operates in many authoritarian states where there is a great incentive
to abuse its presence for the benefit of repressive regimes.[7]
In Burma, for example, the ruling military junta is pressuring U.N.
organizations operating there to coordinate their activities with the
Union Solidarity Development Association—a political organization
sponsored by the regime.[8]
UNDP and other U.N. organizations must not allow themselves to be used
for such purposes, which undermine their core mission in Burma. It is
reasonable to suspect that the operations of the UNDP and other U.N.
relief organizations operating under the world’s most repressive
regimes—such as those in power in Zimbabwe, Syria, and elsewhere—are
not immune from major governmental interference.
UNDP
has demonstrated a stunning arrogance in resisting efforts by UN member
states to exercise proper and prudent oversight of UNDP activities,
projects, and financial transactions. Access to UNDP audits, records,
and documents is critical to proper oversight and governance. Congress
should be concerned that U.S. taxpayer dollars are going to a program
that forbids U.S. government representatives from making sure that
those dollars are properly spent.
Recommendations
In
September 2007, Senator Norm Coleman (R–MN) introduced legislation that
would have withheld all U.S. funds from UNDP activities unless it
submitted to a robust and centralized ethics program that would include
strong protections for whistleblowers.[9]
Unfortunately, the recently passed omnibus appropriations bill watered
down that amendment and substituted a provision to withhold only 20
percent of U.S. funds appropriated for the UNDP until the Secretary of
State reports to Congress that UNDP was “giving adequate access to
information to the Department of State regarding UNDP’s programs and
activities as requested … conducting oversight of UNDP programs and
activities globally; and implementing a whistleblower protection policy
equivalent to that recommended by the United Nations Secretary General
on December 3, 2007.”
While these requirements
may seem strict at first blush, in fact they were easily met by UNDP
and fall far short of what is necessary. In order to ensure the proper
operation of UNDP in North Korea and other countries where it operates,
the United States should:
· Withhold
all U.S. contributions to UNDP until the organization provides all
member states with unfettered access to all information and audits
relating to UNDP projects and other activities. UNDP currently
restricts access to its audit reports and other critical information
about its projects and activities. Even nations sitting on the UNDP’s
Executive Board cannot freely access this information. Making matters
worse, North Korea actually holds a position on the Executive Board and
uses this position to impede efforts to access this information. The
opaque nature of UNDP impedes proper governance and oversight of the
organization. It is reasonable to believe that numerous objectionable
activities conducted by UNDP would not have come to light except for
the actions of several brave whistleblowers and concerned U.S.
officials. Increased access, including allowing member states to have
copies of audit reports promptly, and allowing them to make that
information public, would address this problem.
· Release all relevant information relating to UNDP activities in North Korea.
During the Senate’s investigative hearing, Senator Tom Coburn (R–OK)
revealed that the U.S. Department of State has additional classified
information relating to UNDP activities in North Korea that would serve
to further inform whether program funds were used by that country to
directly support activities unrelated to development projects.[10]
The Department of State should release—with appropriate redactions to
protect sources or other information that could compromise U.S.
national security—all relevant information on this matter in order to
substantiate or refute such reports.
· Investigate UNDP activities in other authoritarian states.
A number of allegations have been made over improper activities funded
by, or linked to, UNDP staff or projects in authoritarian states,
including Burma, Syria, and Zimbabwe. The Senate Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations should expand its investigation to include UNDP
activities in those countries. Similarly, the U.S. Mission to the
United Nations should continue its inquiry into UNDP activities and
support the Senate’s investigation by pursuing audits, reports, and
other information on UNDP activities in these countries to see if the
organization is fully complying with its rules and procedures.
· Require UNDP to submit to the authority of the U.N. Ethics Office or to adopt equivalent ethics standards.
One of the few substantive reforms implemented by former
Secretary-General Kofi Annan was to establish an Ethics Office that had
a mandate to protect whistleblowers from retaliation. After UNDP was
found to have retaliated against a whistleblower by the Ethics Office,
the UNDP rejected the jurisdiction and authority of the Ethics Office
and initiated its own inquiry. Secretary-General Ban subsequently bowed
to UNDP and permitted U.N. funds and programs to set up their own
ethics offices. Unfortunately, UNDP announced whistleblower protections
that are substantially weaker than those of the U.N. Ethics Office.[11]
The U.S. should demand that UNDP adopt, at a minimum, the U.N.
Secretariat standards or submit to the jurisdiction the U.N. Ethics
Office.
Conclusion
The
United Nations Development Program has systematically resisted efforts
by its member states to access audits, reports, and other information
on its activities, projects, and financial transactions. Such access is
critical to proper oversight and good governance. Worse, the
organization has rejected standard U.N. rules and protections for
whistleblowers and has retaliated against staff that have sought to
inform member states about activities of the organization that were not
in the best interest of UNDP, the donors, or the people in recipient
nations.
Last year, Congress adopted language
that would have withheld a mere 20 percent of UNDP funds until the
Secretary of State certified that the organization had taken steps to
address its opacity, poor management, and insufficient protection of
whistleblowers. Unfortunately, the language was weak, and UNDP easily
met these standards without substantially addressing its problems. As a
result, UNDP can expect full funding in 2008.
This
sends precisely the wrong message to UNDP. Congress should utilize the
power of the purse to express its dissatisfaction with UNDP activities
and withhold U.S. funds from the organization until it meets two
conditions: it provides unfettered access to all internal audits,
financial documents, and other relevant information to member states;
and it either adopts strong whistleblower protections (at least
equivalent to those of the U.N. Ethics Office) or submits to the
jurisdiction of that body.
[1]Staff
Report of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, “United Nations
Development Program: A Case Study of North Korea,” United States Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, January 24,
2007, at http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/012408Report.pdf..
[2]See
Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., Brett D. Schaefer, and Steven Groves, “The UNDP
North Korea Scandal: How Congress and the Bush Administration Should
Respond,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo #1318, January 22, 2007, at www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/wm1318.cfm; and Brett D. Schaefer, “Oppose Handing UNDP Control of U.N. Country Activities,” Heritage Foundation WebMemo #1434, April 26, 2007, at www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/wm1434.cfm.
[3]Report
of the Board of Auditors on the Special audit requested by the ACABQ
into activities of UNDP, UNFPA, UNOPS and UNICEF in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), May 31, 2007, at www.undp.org/dprk/docs/DPRK-prelimauditreport-20070601.pdf;
and George Russell, “U.N. Auditors Find Development Program Broke Rules
in Offering Aid to North Korea,” Fox News, June 1, 2007, at www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,277172,00.html.
[4]Letter
from U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Mark D. Wallace to Robert
Benson, Director of the United Nations Ethics Office, August 21, 2007,
at www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/attach2_LettertoBensonAugust2107.pdf; and Fox News, “U.S. Pressures U.N. for Action on Ethics Case,” August 23, 2007, at www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,294270,00.html.
[9]Press
release, “Senate Passes Coleman Amendment to Prevent U.S. Funding to
U.N. Development Program Until Implementation of Whistleblower
Protection,” Office of Sen. Norm Coleman, at http://coleman.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=1412.
[11]Government
Accountability Project, “A Comparative Analysis of ST/SGB/2005/21 and
the Updated UNDP Legal Framework for Addressing Non-Compliance with UN
Standards of Conduct,” October 11, 2007, at www.whistleblower.org/doc/2007/SGBUNDP.pdf.