Rohan Gunaratna, the author of Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. He is Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, the vice president of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the author of My Year Inside Radical Islam, which documents his time working for the extremist Al Haramain Islamic Foundation.

and

Steve Schippert, co-founder of the Center for Threat Awareness and managing editor for ThreatsWatch.org.

FP: Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, Rohan Gunaratna, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Steve Schippert, welcome to Frontpage Symposium.

Rohan Gunaratna, let’s begin with you. What foundation would you like to lay down for our discussion on Al-Qaeda’s central leadership and if it is relevant anymore?

Gunaratna: The Al-Qaeda leadership is responsible for the most devastating terrorist attack in history – and it is still free and at large. Except the 9-11 operational shura leader, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, who conceived and planned the operation, and Abu Hafs alias Mohamed Atef, the Emir of the Military Committee of al-Qaeda, most of the consultative council (Majlis shura) members are either free in tribal Pakistan or in detention in Iran.

The fight against al-Qaeda by the US led coalition has reduced al-Qaeda's numerical strength from 3-400 members to about 500 members. About 2000 of these members are now located in Tribal Pakistan and about another 150 members are in Iran. The rest are located elsewhere in conflict zones such as Abu Ayub al Masri, the successor to Abu Musab al Zarqawi's al Qaeda in Iraq.

The al-Qaeda leadership under Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri has forged alliances with many associated groups in the Middle East and in Asia, provided strategic direction and ideological guidance to like minded groups and followers, and more importantly survived making the fight a multigenerational campaign.

In addition to creating several al-Qaedas, the core al-Qaeda leadership responsible for 9-11 presents a threat to life and property too. This was amply demonstrated in the UK plot seeking to use 10 airliners to attack the US that was disrupted in August of 2006. The failure to successfully target and neutralize the core leadership of al-Qaeda is perhaps the biggest failure in the operational counter terrorism campaign by the U.S.

FP: Steve Schippert, what accounts for the failure to successfully target and neutralize the core leadership of al-Qaeda? And how relevant is this core leadership?

Schippert: There is no single point of failure, if we want to use that term, to successfully target and liquidate bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and the rest of al-Qaeda's principal actors. There have been many dynamics involved. In my view, beginning in 2002, it simply came down to choices.

Step back in time and recall that, in the midst of cries - much from within America itself - of impending doom and quagmire for us in Afghanistan, our military made rather shockingly short work of the fabled mujahideen on their home turf in Afghanistan. The problem after was one of invisible lines in the sand. As spectacularly as our military and intelligence performed, they were not and are not omnipotent. Much of the very wily and experienced terrorist leadership chose to stay ahead of the sword's edge and fled into Pakistan or Iran, where they largely remain still today in welcoming or forged sanctuaries.

We could have invaded Pakistan and we could have invaded Iran. But even still, there are no assurances for the armchair generals that the senior leadership of al-Qaeda would have stood still in either place for us to kill. They fled for a reason and they likely would have continued to move. How far do we then send ground forces from the original center of gravity in military pursuit? How many invisible lines do we cross into other sovereign territories?

There are no Panzer lines and this is not the European campaign of World War II.

As to the relevance of al-Qaeda's senior leadership (AQSL), they are as critical today as they were September 10, 2001. Many like to further the notion that AQSL is no longer important, that al-Qaeda has transformed into a 'leaderless jihad' and a global decentralized movement from a centralized controlled cadre of terrorists. To put it succinctly, it's not one or the other and it's not a zero sum game.

Today, al-Qaeda resembles a fan. The senior leadership - bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, Abu Hafs (Atef), et al - are the motor in the center. They drive the speed and direction of activity. Their aligned movements (AQAM) such as al-Qaeda in Iraq and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are the blades of the fan, most directly attached to the AQSL motor and most immediately reactive to its drive. The AQAM blades' mission is to push the wind. And that air around the blades represents the broader and less connected 'movement' of al-Qaeda. And the closer each individual molecule is to one of the blades - physically and ideologically - the more likely they too will become influenced and driven, once removed from the AQSL motor. The farther outlying air away from the blades sees some movement, but is more scattered and moves with decidedly less velocity. Yet still capable of blowing nonetheless.

For those who would still contest that al-Qaeda is simply a decentralized movement, they must then also answer why the movements are still reactively driven by Internet propaganda communications that still come primarily via al-Qaeda's senior leadership through al-Qaeda's established - and quite centralized - production organizations, such as as-Sahab. Nothing is official - such as the recent death of Abu Laith al-Libi - until as-Sahab says so...because as-Sahab is AQSL. And AQSL has lost zero relevance.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi have written an excellent article on their continued significance, and I hope that Daveed will elaborate more here.

Bukhari: There could be many reasons for failure to successfully target Al-Qaeda's Senior Leadership (AQSL) post-9/11. Firstly, the conflict in Afghanistan was not contained within the bounds of the war-ravaged country to arrest and liquidate the terrorist leadership and its assets during the initial phase of Operation Enduring Freedom (OED). The reluctance on the part of the US to deploy significant troops in Afghanistan, and instead its reliance on militias of the non-Pushtun Northern Alliance (NA) to topple the Taliban regime allowed an opportunity to the fleeing Afghan Taliban and foreign militants to cross into Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Subsequently, the conflict and the terrorist phenomenon spilled over into Pakistan.

Secondly, the US decision to invade Iraq diverted US attention away from Afghanistan which allowed the Afghan Taliban and AQSL to regroup and cash upon the US Invasion of Iraq as an opportunity to fan anti-Western feelings and recruit young jihadis for fight in Afghanistan.

The “one step forward, two steps backward” approach adopted by the Pakistani military during military operations in South and North Wazirsitan Agencies between 2003-2006 allowed space and time to AQSL to move in search of sanctuary while keeping its rank and file intact. However, AQSL received numerous blows during the year 2002-2008 when most of its top leadership was captured from Pakistani cities and many of them killed in subsequent US predator drone attacks. Abu Faraj al-Libbi and KSM is a case in point. Presently, we see a younger generation of AQ filling in the void caused by the death of the senior old generation.

Also, increasing-anti-US public sentiments along with the negative role of Pakistani media and academics continue to act as a brake on Pakistani military operations. Growing domestic opposition to President Musharraf and the public perception in Pakistan of Musharraf fighting a “US War” also constrained Pakistani military operations in tribal areas.

Al-Qaeda continues to remain the biggest source of terror in the world today. The terrorist organization survived the onslaught post-9/11 – thanks to the sanctuary offered by the “hospitable” Pushtuns inhabiting in the Pak-Afghan border region. Presently, Al-Qaeda is merely reduced to an ideological and strategic brain for the global jihad, transferring its violent ideology to like-minded previously local militant groups operating in the length and breadth of the Muslim world.

The fact that AQSL has failed to conduct even a single attack in the US – its biggest avowed enemy – mainly due to effective counter-terrorism policies of the international community, speaks amply of the degradation of the organization to merely a propaganda tool that feels intent on releasing videos and messages of hate to its audience in the Muslim world and Muslim diaspora existing in Europe and North America.

At present AQSL poses a more serious threat to the Muslim body than its declared enemy, the US, and we see more coordination between previously Al-Qaeda and previously local militant groups who were waging anti-regime struggles in Muslim countries. From Algeria to Southeast Asia, we find a similarity in the techniques, conduct of terrorist attacks, strategy and ideological motivation. Similarly, Al-Qaeda is also showing flexibility by accepting the argument of Al-Qaeda-affiliated local militant groups in continue to fight against Muslim dictatorial regimes through applying terrorist techniques. The fact that Al-Qaeda exhorted the Pakistanis to overthrow President Musharraf’s government in Pakistan, testifies to this argument.

Al Qaeda, which operated as a separate entity in the 1990s has now been reduced to a few hundred people. This was a success. However, the organization has been resilient in forging ties with local militant groups in various Muslim countries, which poses a greater problem to the international community. These local groups have a vast experience and knowledge of their country of operations and hence terrorist attacks are more deadly than before. Al Qaeda has taught these previously local militant groups about IEDs etc and other terrorist techniques, which has increased the number of terrorist attacks manifold in the Muslim countries. Even home grown jihadists from the West are being escorted in Pakistan by these local militant groups, who take them to Al Qaeda hiding in tribal areas of Pakistan.

At best, while AQSL has been cornered in the rugged frontier region of Pakistan and Afghanistan, its perverted ideology continue to reverberate and spread to its audience all over the world.

Gartenstein-Ross: All participants in this symposium agree that al-Qaeda remains a grave threat, and that its senior leadership plays an important part in the war against the West (although there are some differences between us regarding precisely how AQSL fits in). I would like to begin, though, by outlining why this discussion is necessary. While this panel correctly concludes that al-Qaeda as an organization is central to the international jihadist movement, many analysts and even government officials disagree.

The most prominent proponent of the view that al-Qaeda is marginally relevant has been Jason Burke, a reporter for London’s Observer and the author of Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam. By the time that book hit the shelves in 2003, Burke was already arguing that the “nearest thing to ‘Al-Qaeda,’ as popularly understood,” only existed for a five-year period, and the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001 showcased “the final scenes of its destruction.” Now, Burke contends, we are “in a ‘post-bin Laden’ phase of Islamic militancy.” Other analysts have offered similar assessments. In July 2007, Stratfor’s Peter Zeihan argued that while a few thousand people may claim to be al-Qaeda members, “the real al Qaeda does not exercise any control over them. . . . The United States is now waging a war against jihadism as a phenomenon, rather than against any specific transnational jihadist movement.” In late January of this year, State Department counterterrorism coordinator Dell Dailey described al-Qaeda’s top leadership as isolated, saying they have “much, much less central authority and much, much less capability to reach out.” And in the March/April 2008 issue of Foreign Policy, Marc Sageman argues that the world’s most dangerous terrorists “haven’t been trained in terrorist camps” and “don’t answer to Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri.”

My contention is that all of these commentators underestimate AQSL’s strength, resilience, and relevance. Other panelists have referred to AQSL’s flight to Pakistan and Iran following the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. As Schippert mentioned, my colleague Kyle Dabruzzi and I have described the history of how AQSL was revamped in a recent article in Middle East Quarterly (“Is Al-Qaeda’s Central Leadership Still Relevant?”) that we have also adapted for the Daily Standard. Pakistani tribes offered sanctuary to AQSL after the terror group’s leaders fled from Afghanistan. As AQSL gained strength, they tried to kill Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf twice in December 2003, leading him to send troops into Pakistan’s tribal areas. Al-Qaeda and allied tribes prevailed in the fight, and eventually Musharraf felt that he had no choice but to enter into a series of accords that signaled the government’s defeat. These included two accords over Waziristan in March and September 2006 providing that Pakistan’s military would not carry out air or ground strikes there, including a pledge that Islamabad would disband its human intelligence network. Three similar accords have since been signed in Bajaur (March 2007), Swat (May 2007), and Mohmand (August 2007). These accords are a sign of the safe haven that al-Qaeda has carved out in Pakistan.

When we turn to how the safe haven is used, I must part ways with Bukhari’s assessment that AQSL has been “reduced to an ideological and strategic brain for the global jihad, transferring its violent ideology to like-minded previously local militant groups.” Pakistan now hosts a number of terrorist training camps affiliated with AQSL. For example, video taken at a Pakistani camp last summer showed a graduation ceremony of about 300 recruits for suicide missions. The impact of the Pakistan safe haven can be seen in the more credible recent terror threats. At least two of the 7/7 bombers, Mohammad Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, trained in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda’s senior leaders had enough foreknowledge of 7/7 to send footage of Khan and Tanweer to al-Jazeera afterward. British terror operatives trained in Pakistan for at least half a dozen plots since 2003, while other European countries have likewise seen their extremists travel there for training—a trend dramatically illustrated by the plots disrupted on the same day in Germany and Denmark in September 2007. Beside the training camps, evidence suggests that AQSL may be regenerating its command and control capabilities. For example, multiple intelligence agencies have linked operational command for the August 2006 transatlantic air plot—which homeland security secretary Michael Chertoff said would have killed thousands—to top al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan.

The renewed importance of AQSL can be illustrated by comparing plots where it was involved (either in training or command and control) to plots whose operatives were self-financed and self-trained. The Fort Dix plotters had terrible operational security, actually taking a video of themselves firing weapons and yelling in a foreign tongue to Circuit City to be transferred to DVD. The hydrogen peroxide in the explosives used by Britain’s 7/21 bombers failed to react; as BBC News recounted, the bombs “simply made a ‘popping noise’ and began leaking onto the floor.” Localized cells recognize that they need to link up with international networks. The Miami cell that allegedly wanted to destroy Chicago’s Sears Tower reached out to al-Qaeda because they doubted they could succeed on their own. And according to the indictment in the June 2007 JFK airport plot, plotters wanted to “present the plan to contacts overseas who may be interested in purchasing or funding it.”

While AQSL’s propaganda campaign has been the most noticeable facet of its operations over the past few years, the available evidence suggests that it is operationally relevant as well. A strong central leadership makes the group more formidable, with greater destructive potential. It is thus important to understand the degree to which al-Qaeda has managed to regroup.

Gunaratna: Steve Schippert refers to "al Qaeda Senior Leadership" (AQSL) to identify Osama bin Laden's group operating in FATA. It may create the wrong impression that AQSL is not a group but a few senior leaders without members directly controlled by them. AQ is very much a group. Core al Qaeda is still capable but is investing a bulk of its operational resources to build the associated groups and its ideological resources to build the homegrown cells from its new home in FATA.

After the capture of KSM in Rawalpindi and Tawfiq bin Attash in Karachi, in early 2003, al-Qaeda’s center of operations moved to FATA especially to South Waziristan. With ISID gaining intelligence dominance in the big cities of Pakistan, al-Qaeda lost several hundred of its operatives. More than 25% of the detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were arrested in Pakistan. Having suffered severely in Pakistani cities of Karachi, Lahore, and Rawalpindi, al-Qaeda retreated to FATA. Although its communication and contact to the outside world was limited, hampered, and disrupted, al-Qaeda focused on building and strengthening their networks in FATA.

Here they received the protection and support from local clerics and tribal members from the Mehsud and Wazir tribes, many of whom had been serving with the Taliban in Afghanistan since 1990’s. The Ahmadzai-Wazir tribe and specifically Local Taliban members of the clans living in the Shakai valley were the main hosts of the Arabs while the Yargulkhel sub-clan of the Zalikhel clan (Ahmadzai-Wazir tribe) became the main host of the Uzbeks on the Wana plains of South Waziristan.The Ahmadzai-Wazir’s are mostly situated in the Western and Southern areas of South Waziristan, while the Mehsud’s dominate the Northern and Central part of South Waziristan.

Al-Qaeda’s operational structure in South Waziristan Agency included the Egyptians, Hamza Rabia, who later came to head al-Qaeda’s External Operations, and Muhsin Musa Matwali Atwa aka Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir, who was involved in planning the attacks against the U.S. Embassies in East Africa in 1998. Muhajir had also been a top bomb-maker at al-Qaeda’s Mes Aynak camp near Kabul and from 2005 until his death, headed al-Qaeda’s training structure in North Waziristan. They were capable leaders, but a degree less capable than KSM who had a better understanding of the West.

Furthermore, unlike KSM who took very high risks and had a forward operational base in Karachi, they were operating from safety deep inside Pakistan on the Afghanistan border. They were constrained by the lack of communication and contact with the outside world. Hence they lacked the opportunity to recruit directly and had limited control of the operations. Although they managed to create training opportunities in FATA, as opposed to training camps in Afghanistan, they had few recruits that came from the West (who understood how to operate in the West) to train. As opposed to KSM who trained and dispatched recruits to the West to mount attacks, they were much more reliant on the homegrown Jihadists of the West, who they would try to empower and focus towards planning attacks in the West.

Abu Faraj al-Libi assumed leadership of al-Qaeda’s Internal Operations. Operating out of his base in Bajaur Agency, Abu Faraj found it difficult to stay in contact with al-Qaeda’s main structure in South Waziristan Agency. This complicated his contact to foreign recruits coming to al-Qaeda’s training facilities in this Agency. As Hamza Rabia was based in South Waziristan, he was chosen to succeed KSM as of head al-Qaeda’s External Operations. During 2002-4, al-Qaeda and many other foreign and Pakistani militant groups re-established a smaller and more rudimentary version of their Afghan training infrastructure in Shakai Valley of South Waziristan. A clear indication of Hamza Rabia and al-Qaeda’s presence in South Waziristan was Abu Faraj and Hamza Rabia’s meetings with the British citizen, Dhiren Barot aka Abu Issa al-Brittani in April 2004.

Abu Issa al-Brittani traveled to South Waziristan Agency seeking approval and guidance on how to move forward with his plans to attack a range of targets in the United Kingdom and the United States, including the Prudential building, New York Stock Exchange and Citigroup’s headquarters in New York as well as the International Monetary Fund’s headquarters in Washington D.C.

During the planning for these attacks, Abu Talha al-Pakistani also provided military training to twelve individuals from Tooting, a Suburb of London. Today, the U.S., its allies and friends face a sustained threat from this al Qaeda inspired global jihad movement. The delay in neutralizing the core al Qaeda leadership has resulted in the spawning of a global movement. The constituents of the global jihad movement consist of Al Qaeda, its operationally connected like-minded associated groups, and its ideologically-driven homegrown cells. To enlist Muslim territorial, diaspora, and migrant support, Al Qaeda frames the struggle as a defensive battle. By building an alliance of 30 to 40 local jihad groups and ideologically indoctrinating Muslims, Al Qaeda has taken control of the public face of a movement that campaigns to create Islamic states. To win the fight, it is time to kinetically concentrate on AQSL and non kinetically on its influence.

Schippert: Well, I hope my description did not leave the impression Dr. Gunaratna feared possible. Glad he expanded on it.

Two very quick points: Daveed is absolutely correct in my view by pointing out the greater issue at hand (for Americans and the West), which is acknowledging why this discussion is so important. There is room for the authoring of a concise book on that theme. Thanks for that.

Secondly, Rohan concludes with a couple of good points/suggestions going forward; that it is time for kinetic operations against AQSL, which are currently lacking, and non-kinetic operations against their influence.

The average reader hopefully reads that and asks himself or herself, "OK, so what exactly is al-Qaeda Senior Leadership's influence? How do we identify it and target it?"

I have my own ideas on AQSL's influence, their avenues and means of such. (Calling such a very complex soft target understates greatly.) But rather than stating them, I would ask Rohan if he could expand on this for the average person, what his ideas of both the non-kinetic operations in mind and the avenues and means of AQSL influence to be targeted would be.

Gunaratna: Schippert's proposal is a very useful one. If developed and implemented, it may one day enable us to win both the kinetic and the non kinetic fight.

First, we should seek to better understand the kinetic and the non kinetic threats. Contemporary jihadist networks consist of cells that engage in support and operational activity.

Jihadist support activities are

(1) Propaganda

(2) Recruitment

(3) Finance

(4) Procurement

(5) Transportation

(6) Safe houses

(7) Travel

(8) Communication

(9) Training

(10) Multiple identities

Jihadist operational activities are:

(1) Initial surveillance and reconnaissance

(2) Rehearsal

(3) Final surveillance and reconnaissance

(4) Attack

Jihadist support activities enable operational activity. By detecting and disrupting these components, the power of support and operational activities can be reduced to manageable levels. Of the support activities, countering jihadist propaganda requires a knowledge of its content. This is largely the domain of the Muslim clerics, scholars and intellectuals. We need to mobilize them, support them, and work with them. This is what we have accomplished in Singapore.

Finally, I would support and participate in Schippert proposal on publication of a text on the subject. It should seek to educate everyone but specifically geared to Western policy and decision makers.

Gartenstein-Ross: I very much appreciate Schippert and Gunaratna’s contributions to this symposium, particularly Gunaratna’s learned exposition on AQSL’s rise in Pakistan’s tribal areas. I also support Schippert’s idea of a broader text on the subject. I suspect the symposium contributors may have some offline discussion on the matter.

With respect to the kinetic and non-kinetic threats that Gunaratna outlines above, I would like to point out that Pakistan’s new government has massively accelerated talks with armed Islamic extremist factions—and entered into a new series of accords that are likely to make the U.S., its allies, and Pakistan itself less safe. Bill Roggio and I discussed these new negotiations and agreements in detail in a recent article we published in the Weekly Standard, titled “Descent into Appeasement.”

The first of these new agreements was struck with the North-West Frontier Province’s Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (the TNSM, or the Movement for the Implementation of Mohammad’s Sharia Law) on April 20 in the Malakand Division. The TNSM is led by Maulana Sufi Mohammed, who was imprisoned in 2002 for providing fighters to the Taliban in Afghanistan (something the TNSM continues to do to this day). Pakistan and the TNSM entered into a six-point deal in which the TNSM renounced attacks on Pakistan’s government in exchange for the promise that sharia law would be imposed in Malakand. The government also freed Sufi Mohammed.

A month later, Pakistan inked another deal with the Taliban in the Swat district. Led by Mullah Fazlullah (Sufi Mohammed’s son-in-law), the Swat Taliban has been waging a brutal insurgency in the once-peaceful vacation spot: more than 200 Pakistani soldiers and police have been killed since January 2007. The 15-point agreement between Pakistan and the Swat Taliban stipulates that the military will withdraw its forces, and the government will allow the imposition of sharia law, permit Fazlullah to broadcast on his previously-banned radio channel, and turn Fazlullah’s madrassa into an “Islamic University.” Pakistan has also negotiated a similar agreement with a Tehrik-i-Taliban leader in the Mohmand agency.

In South Waziristan, Pakistan is negotiating with Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Tehrik-i-Taliban, who is considered one of Pakistan’s deadliest militant leaders. Mehsud has long adhered to the Taliban’s ideology, frequently visiting Afghanistan in the mid-1990s and gaining an appointment as Mullah Omar’s governor of the Mehsud tribe. Mehsud’s forces are responsible for killing and kidnapping hundreds of Pakistani soldiers; he has masterminded a suicide-bombing campaign throughout Pakistan, and is thought to be responsible for former prime minister Benazir Bhutto’s assassination. Pakistan has also begun negotiations with the Taliban in the district of Kohat.

What is wrong with these talks? First and foremost, they are likely to fail because Pakistan has done nothing to answer the problems of the past accords and is again accepting promises that it has no means of enforcing. The Waziristan accords and subsequent agreements that Pakistan entered into in 2007 were definitive failures. Those accords—and the new ones—create breathing space for extremists, since the militants rather than the government will determine when the fighting will resume. Moreover, such agreements allow a greater flow of recruits to the militants’ training camps.

These new accords are also a threat to the U.S. Baitullah Mehsud has told journalists that “jihad in Afghanistan will continue” regardless of negotiations, a sentiment echoed by other Taliban leaders. U.S. forces in Afghanistan will face increased cross-border attacks, and Americans at home should be concerned about the increased risk of another catastrophic terrorist attack. The 9/11 Commission Report warns that a terrorist organization requires “time, space, and the ability to perform competent planning and staff work” in order to carry out a 9/11-like attack. Pakistan’s new accords help al-Qaeda and its allies have that requisite time and space.

Be prepared for things to get worse before they get better. The U.S. faces a serious dearth of good options—and as I have made clear, Pakistan lacks the political will to address al-Qaeda’s resurgence.

FP: Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, Rohan Gunaratna, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Steve Schippert, thank you for joining Frontpage Symposium.