A new deadly strain of terrorism is on the horizon. How can we defeat it? To discuss the future of terror with us today, Frontpage Symposium is joined by a distinguished panel:
Evan Kohlmann, the author of Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe and founder of Globalterroralert.com. He is currently scheduled to testify as an expert witness on behalf of federal prosecutors in the upcoming trial of alleged jihad recruiter Ali al-Timimi in northern Virginia;
Simon Reeve, a New York Times bestselling author and television presenter. His book The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism, which warned of a new age of apocalyptic terrorism, was the first in the world on bin Laden and al Qaeda;
Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, the author of Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. He is Head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore;
and
Dan Darling, a counter-terrorism consultant for the Manhattan Institute's Center for Policing Terrorism. He is considered the terrorologist of the blogosphere. Visit his blog at Regnum Crucis.
FP: Simon Reeve, Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Evan Kohlmann and Dan Darling, welcome to Frontpage Symposium.
Mr. Reeve, let me begin with you. Let’s start with the basics. How do you think the War on Terror is going? And in what form do you think future threats will emerge?
Reeve: Thanks Jamie, and hello to Dr. Gunaratna, Mr. Kohlmann and Mr. Darling.
If I was writing a school report on the Bush administration's handling of the 'war on terror', then I'd be scribbling 'could do much better' in the margin.
Tackling international terrorism requires a number of different responses: military, political, social, diplomatic, economic and cultural. Short-term politicians might prefer to tell their electors that they're just going to bomb the terrorists, but in the long-run that doesn't work. It just encourages more people to join the group.
I believe the US government has been adopting a short-term view of the war on terror and has failed to address the root causes of terror which have encouraged militants around the world to support al Qaeda. The US should have done more to encourage a swift resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the benefit of both sides. It should ask why so many people around the world feel hatred for America. Why do the polls show America is more hated now, after the appalling 9/11 attacks, than before? It’s not good enough to simply say ‘they hate us because we are free and rich’.
The way Iraq was attacked was a major mistake. I remember when the war was being launched US politicians were claiming Iraq was a terrorist 'hornet nest' that needed to be smashed. Then when the US led the occupation I talked with one very senior US official who said he viewed Iraq as fly-paper -- attracting militants from around the region who the US army could then take-on and destroy far from the US mainland.
But I fear Iraq has been, and is still, an engine driving terrorism -- attracting young militants who receive training and indoctrination, and will then take their anti-US hatred and terror skills back to other countries. This is what happened on a larger scale in Afghanistan during the 1980s, leading to the creation of what we now call al Qaeda.
In summary, defeating terror, to use a simple analogy, needs a carrot and stick approach. So far there’s been too much stick from the Bush administration, and not enough carrot.
In terms of crystal-ball gazing for future threats, it’s important to remember al Qaeda has become as much a state of mind as an actual terror organization. Bin Laden’s hatred has infected thousands of young men around the world. A militant doesn’t need to have an al Qaeda membership card to launch an attack – they just need to have hatred in their heart and the ability to strike. In our increasingly globalised world, there are US and Western targets everywhere. I believe we will see more attacks on these ‘frontier outposts’ by small cells of disaffected, angry young men, and militant cells which are emerging in many countries.
The single greatest threat, however, is biological. I’ve been to chemical and biological weapons labs in the former Soviet Union, and been shocked by the appalling levels of security. A terrorist with access to smallpox or another nasty disease from a former Soviet lab, or one in France, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, etc, is what occasionally keeps me awake at night.
I would be very interested to hear what Dr. Gunaratna, Mr. Kohlmann and Mr. Darling think of the war on terror, and their opinions on future threats.
FP: Thank you Mr. Reeve. Let me jump in for a moment.
Bush could certainly do “much better” in handling the terror war, especially if the Left didn’t block his administration’s efforts at every turn. It might have helped if the Democrats, represented by the likes of Kerry, Kennedy, Gore and Carter, hadn’t turned the war into a partisan issue and consistently attempted to tie the administration’s hands behind its back.
I think one could also blame the terrorists for the terror war not going “better.” The process of democratization in Iraq may be facing some stumbling blocks when psychopaths blow themselves up alongside innocent civilians, including women and babies in strollers.
True enough, bombing terrorists might encourage “more people to join the group.” But bombing the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan surely did a thing or two, and so have the bombings of terrorist sanctuaries in Iraq.
To blame the U.S. for not bringing a “swift” resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is disingenuous. The problem may actually have something to do with Yasser Arafat and his thugs never being interested in a real peace and systematically pursuing the killing of Jews.
And the Americans are supposed to be asking themselves why they are hated? Let me guess, they brought 9/11 unto themselves, right? Are we really still stuck wondering what we could have done not to make the Islamists hate us so much? When Jews study the Holocaust, should they be agonizing what they may have done wrong to make the Nazis revile them? Surely it is common sense that scapegoating exists and that peoples’ hatred often says more about them than about those they hate.
What are we supposed to do when forces in this world wage war on us because they believe that women should wrap their whole bodies up and that they should not have personal and sexual freedom? What do we do when these forces hate the idea of women’s rights, homosexual rights, minority rights, the separation of religion and state, and every other democratic right imaginable?
We are dealing with nihilists and despots who worship a death-cult. They hate modern liberalism and democracy and their ideology is the cousin of fascism and communism. When we faced Stalin and Hitler, the last thing we needed to do was agonize over why they didn’t like our societies, lifestyles and systems of government. Neither should we do anything different in confronting the Osamas and Al Zarqawis.
Mr. Reeve, you say that the way Iraq was attacked was a “major mistake.” But it liberated 25 million people and, like in Afghanistan, it brought the promise of democracy to the suffering citizens of that nation. Iraq’s liberation also cancelled out the possibility that Saddam could arm terrorists with WMDs. Moreover, it has sent reverberating shock waves of liberty throughout the Arab world.
Mr. Reeve, you point out the dangers we are facing, but you seem to only blame the administration. You have not suggested how we can defeat these terrorists, aside from a blurry reference to some kind of “carrot” that we should be offering. What “carrot” exactly will make bin Laden and Zarqawi and their followers decide that women’s rights, equality, individual rights and democracy are good ideas?
In any case, Mr. Kohlmann, let’s move over to you. Mr. Reeve points out that the greatest threat now is biological. Could you kindly comment on that and what we can do about it?
Kohlmann: Greetings to Dr. Gunaratna, Mr. Reeve and Mr. Darling, and many thanks to Frontpage Magazine.
Before I address the prospect of future CBRN (chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear) terrorist attacks, I would like to jump into the debate you have already begun here. While I concur with Simon that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a constant source of anti-Western grievances, I would dissuade anyone of the notion that there is a "quick" or "easy" solution that can be engineered by U.S. diplomats. When it comes to the Palestinian question, I think it is much more critical to establish a just and lasting peace rather than merely an expedient one. In 1994, the Clinton administration advocated a premature Israeli-Palestinian peace accord--one that ultimately collapsed under extreme pressure from militants in Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and even the late Yassir Arafat's Fatah party. In the future, we want to ensure that such peace agreements are internationally binding and are upheld by all parties that are signatories to them--with no exceptions. Let noone be mistaken: it is the Palestinian people who have the most to gain from peace with Israel--not the United States.
Unfortunately, I do tend to agree with Simon's comments on Iraq, and particularly his description of Iraq as an "engine" of anti-Western terrorism. The U.S. invaded Iraq under the justification of eliminating weapons of mass destruction and destroying a major base of regional terrorism. However, in over eight years of exhaustive research, I have yet to see a single shred of credible evidence proving even an abstract link between the former regime of Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaida. While U.S. policymakers initially believed that the invasion of Iraq would be a major blow to international terrorism, this was, in fact, a critical error. Instead, the prolonged power vacuum in post-war Iraq has left the country open to new infiltration by a host of terrorist and extremist groups. Al-Qaida as an organization functions very much like a virus--and like a virus, it absolutely requires a host nation from which to manifest itself. In previous decades, Al-Qaida has sought refuge in places like Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and beyond--countries from which the organization has recruited operatives, trained them in the arts of warfare, and then ultimately dispatched them on terrorist missions around the world. By invading Iraq in 2003, we inadvertently created the precise conditions that Al-Qaida needed in order to manifest itself from within the very heart of the Arab world. Thus, in a sense, we have blundered into a Catch-22 trap of our own making. Even if stable democracy is eventually established in Iraq, it is already too late to stop the formation of a new transnational terrorist army, one that is fearlessly loyal to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Usama Bin Laden. Our primary focus should now be on identifying prominent Al-Qaida leaders and operatives in Iraq, preventing them from exfiltrating back into the Middle East and Europe, and ultimately decapitating their organization(s) as a terrorist threat. Even just a handful of Zarqawi's followers set loose beyond the borders of Iraq pose a clear and present danger to U.S. and European national security.
Under the watchful encouragement of "third generation" terrorist commanders like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Al-Qaida is quickly developing into a loose collective of disparate Islamic militant groups and sleeper cell networks dedicated to undermining America and her allies by any means necessary. As Simon pointed out, it has also become more of ideology rather than a strict delineated organization--and, thus, there is a strong potential of "lone wolf" attacks committed by random fanatics mobilized by Al-Qaida's radically anti-Western propaganda. In the absence of a coherent hierarchical organization and given the rise of ruthless extremists like Zarqawi, it becomes inherently more likely that future terrorist attacks will involve weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, biological, radiological, or even nuclear agents. Zarqawi's larger network has already been linked to several failed plots involving such toxins as cyanide, ricin, and anthrax. It is also clear that these same conspirators are willing to carry out their deadly missions even if they directly result in the deaths of hundreds of innocent Muslims.
Even four years after 9/11, the Bush administration has yet to successfully engineer a lasting overhaul of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. While the President and his administration are to be commended for their efforts on the USA Patriot Act and the virtual defeat of Al-Qaida in Afghanistan, precious little progress has been made at home towards reforming either the FBI or the CIA. In fact, information sharing and cooperation between these agencies is at an abysmal level. If stubbornly ensconced bureaucrats continue to interfere with ongoing counterterrorism reform, the American people must hold them personally responsible for any potential consequences. Unfortunately, we may only recognize this frustrating failure in the advent of another 9/11.
In order to defeat the next generation of international terrorists, America must field its own counterterrorist army of trained, experienced, and open-minded personnel who can understand Al-Qaida the way that we once understood the Soviet KGB. These individuals must be trained in languages including Arabic and Farsi. They must also understand the critical need to provide reasoned analysis to policymakers that is devoid of irrelevant political influence. Finally, the next time we decide to invade another country--even to depose a regime as despicable as that of Saddam Hussein--let us first carefully consider the potential long-term consequences of our actions. Even the best intentions can result in an unfortunate outcome.
FP: Thank you Mr. Kohlmann.
I guess the debate over the Saddam-Osama link continues. Suffice it to say that Laurie Mylroie and Steven Hayes have made a sound case for the connection. And surely the Bush administration had no choice but to act when the remotest possibility existed that Saddam could place WMDs into the hands of those who perpetrated 9/11 – or their like-minded species.
Mr. Kohlmann, you pinpoint some potential high costs we paid in taking out Saddam and fighting the terrorists in Iraq. But no military action will come without its trade-offs. Could it not also be said that the liberation of Iraq was crucial in that we needed to trigger the process of democratization in the Arab Middle East? The removal of Saddam has clearly sparked the domino effect that we now see beginning -- as the Arab Berlin wall is clearly beginning to crack: the Lebanese people power in the streets, Saudis talking of women voting, Egyptians talking of elections, Syria recoiling from Lebanon etc.
It is an undeniable fact that terrorism has its hiding and breeding grounds in areas of tyranny. The best way we can end terrorism is to crush tyranny and do our best to put democracy in its place. I think that is what the liberation of Iraq is about. We have no choice but to liberate more enslaved peoples in the Arab Middle East if we are going to have a chance of winning this terror war.
And while the U.S. action in Iraq surely fuelled some hatred and attracted terrorists to come to Iraq, could it not be said that these fanatics are going to hate us anyway and that we might as well pick the place where we fight and kill them? Surely the U.S. war on terror in Iraq has hurt the Islamist cause in numerous ways -- diverting their energies from elsewhere, taking terrorists’ lives, decapitating their leadership, crippling their resources etc.
Mr. Darling, your turn.
Mr. Kohlmann has given us a heads-up about a terrifying formation of a new transnational terrorist army in the works. Operatives of this army could now, as he says, be bound for borders beyond Iraq. In the absence of a coherent hierarchical organization, he warns there could be increasing “lone wolf” attacks and that these could, very likely, as Mr. Reeve has suggested, eventually involve some sort of WMDs.
Mr. Kohlmann has given some strong recommendations. What can you add to these, so that our future counterterrorist army can effectively fight this potential horror?
Darling: Greetings to Dr. Gunaratna (who was extremely generous in his editing of my work on Ansar al-Islam), Mr. Reeve, and Mr. Kohlmann, and thanks to Frontpage Magazine.
As to the issue of whether the war in Iraq has helped or hurt terrorism, I think that the realities are a lot more complex due to the politicized nature of the question. While my own view is that there was at least some significant interaction between the former Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda/the Zarqawi network and would tend to attribute much of the murkiness on that particular subject to the "war over analysis" that took place between the CIA and the Pentagon (particularly with regard to the claims made by Moammar Ahmed Yousef and Ibn Sheikh al-Libi among others), I expect that I'm going to be in the minority view of the opinion that overthrowing Saddam deprived al-Qaeda of an ally.
That said, while I think that al-Qaeda has almost certainly been using Iraq as a rallying cry for its supporters and associate groups, as can be seen with all the terrorist recruiting networks that have been shut down by European and Middle Eastern law enforcement, I don't think that our intelligence on the network is good enough to the point where we can quantify whether they're having a "good" or a "bad" year as far as recruiting is concerned.
We know that Islamist fighters are being sent to Iraq, yet we also know that there are fewer and fewer Arab recruits being sent to fight in Chechnya or Kashmir, that bin Laden has cut down funding for the Taliban to support Zarqawi and other Iraqi Islamist groups, etc. Moreover, the al-Qaeda strategy document Iraq al-Jihad that appears to have played no small role in the timing called of the 3/11 attacks in Spain called for carrying out attacks in Western Europe in order to force the withdrawal of coalition states, which implies at least to me that they don't believe that a simple insurgency is sufficient to evict coalition forces from the country.
In January 2004 and again recently, Zarqawi has issued pleas for assistance to the global al-Qaeda network, the Islamist Internationale, if you will. All of this would seem to suggest that the terrorists do not regard themselves as being in ascendance inside Iraq, otherwise attacks outside the country and calls for assistance would be unnecessary.
That said, I wouldn't be surprised if al-Qaeda recruiting were on the rise internationally, even though there is no objective way to prove or discount this due to the intelligence issues I mentioned above. As a general rule, I strongly suspect that more Islamists who were previously "on the fence" with regard to violence are more likely to resort to terrorism when they see what they regard as definitive proof of the US-led global conspiracy against Islam that al-Qaeda argues exists, such as the US missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan or the US invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11. The same is also true for actions entirely unrelated to the US, such as the fighting in Chechnya, south Thailand, or Mindanao.
Until we get better intelligence on how to quantify terrorist recruiting, such as the number of enrolments in radical madrassas in the Middle East and South Asia that serve as the incubators for al-Qaeda and other groups' cadres (Binori Town springs immediately to mind) rather than their cannon fodder, we're essentially dealing with a dart board rather than with the closest we can get to definitive figures as far as the ebb and flow of terrorist recruiting.
I'm also a lot less worried about the "lone wolf" terrorists than is Mr. Kohlmann. If you look at the purported chemical attack in Jordan last April that allegedly could have killed thousands, it was ordered by Zarqawi and going to be implemented by a detailed network stretching across Jordan into Syria and Iraq. It's that kind of infrastructure and groups, in my opinion, that are far more of a danger with respect to any potential WMD attack than are the lone wolves like Hesham Hedayat. The latter can still kill people, but the former is essential with respect to mass casualty terrorist attacks.
That said, I think Mr. Kohlmann's recommendations are extremely sound ones. My advice would be to look very carefully at the approaches and methodologies that European nations have been extremely successful at using to defeat both domestic and international terrorist organizations since the 1970s. From a strategic perspective, I think that utilizing the approaches that Dr. Gunaratna laid out at the end of Inside Al Qaeda were quite sound when he first wrote them in 2002 and I think they still are 3 years later. While they are far too lengthy to enumerate here, I still think that adopting these approaches represents our best way of countering the current threat.
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