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Frontpage Interview’s guests today are Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, co-authors of the new book, Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography. Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center of the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) in Herzliya, Israel. He is also editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.  Judith Colp Rubin is a journalist who has reported worldwide for several different North American publications and was publisher/editor-in-chief of Women's International Net Magazine. The couple also co-wrote Hating America: A History. 

FP: Rubins, welcome to Frontpage Interview.

Judith Colp Rubin: It's great to be here again.

FP: What is it like to have written a biography of Yasir Arafat?

Barry Rubin: I’m glad you asked that question. If one examines the objective evidence—the basic history, the events and the statements he made, it is clear that Arafat was very much a strategist of terrorism, someone who sabotaged peace, an extremist and a dictator. In fact, he was never even a true nationalist in the sense of someone whose main priority was to obtain a state and benefit his own people. He was essentially different from the scores of others who led nationalist movements throughout the Third World. That is one of the reasons that Arafat failed and that the conflict remains unresolved today.

And yet the mythology is so powerful that to point out these basic realities is held by many—especially in Europe—to be a highly partisan act of propaganda. Even to identify Arafat with terrorism or point out how he sabotaged the Oslo process is simply unacceptable. There are few people so immune to serious examination and evaluation. That is why in the 1970s, U.S. intelligence officials labeled Arafat the “teflon terrorist.”   Arafat’s greatest success was in the field of public relations. What is especially ironic is that Arabs and Palestinians, especially in private conversation, do not share the Western illusions on this matter. 

We worked very hard to present a fair picture. The evaluation of any figure should be based on examining the evidence. We used a massive amount of Arabic and archival sources, including very extensive quotations from Arafat himself and his colleagues.

Since the book came out, and Arafat died, its contents have been amply vindicated. Revelations of corruption and the ease with which the four-year-long war began by Arafat has been ended, among many other factors, show how accurate is the picture we presented. We added some of this material when the book recently came out in paperback.

FP: What is Arafat’s legacy and how is it affecting current events?

Barry Rubin: Arafat's legacy affects the entire world. In a very real sense, he was the godfather of the radical movements born in the Middle East that have ushered in a new era of global terrorism.

First, he demonstrated that terrorism can be a very effective tool for mobilizing people. True, terrorism had been used throughout history, but up until recently it was rejected by most revolutionary movements which were shaped by Marxism’s opposition to terrorism. Arafat introduced it as a populist revolutionary tool for building a movement. He proved how politically profitable a terrorist strategy could be, thus encouraging imitators.

Second, Arafat showed that terrorism could be carried out with little political cost, another factor inspiring imitators. Arafat’s revolutionary persona and underdog appeal gave him cachet with leftist sympathizers in the West, something he and later movements would use to great effect. It was this support that allowed Arafat to demand concessions from his adversaries and reject good-faith offers despite his own position of weakness.

Finally, Arafat helped make anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism respectable again. By constantly portraying Israel—and more subtly Jews—as evil, Arafat returned this stereotype to international acceptance, reversing the effect of the horror of Nazism and its effects. While it is easy to attribute Arafat’s hostility to the United States to U.S. support for Israel, it was actually part of his revolutionary ideology from the beginning, going back to the early 1960s, long before the U.S. aid to Israel had begun. Again, the true blossoming of this effect came only after President Bill Clinton tried so strenuously to produce a political solution that met Palestinian needs and interests.

His legacy is also a powerful one on the Palestinian movement. First, despite the rejection of this idea by many of the new leaders, the movement remains focused on the destruction of Israel rather than a healthy nationalism which would focus on building an economically viable, cultural developed Palestinian state. Its focus is not on creating a wonderful country of its own but rather of a “return” intended to recreate a mythical pre-1948 Palestine.

Second, its tactics remain focused on a glorified anti-civilian terrorism that at most might be temporarily abandoned if it appears to be too politically costly. This approach is justified not only by hatred and a total disbelief in the other side’s readiness to make real peace, but more deeply in the assumption that such violence will cause Israel to collapse or surrender.

Third, its political culture revolves around the glorification of armed struggle, the legitimacy of terrorism, deification of total victory, and definition of moderation as treason. This view is spread through schools, mosques and the media. Defeats are perceived as victories, the extent of international support and Israel’s weakness are overestimated, and thousands of dead Palestinians are glorified as martyrs, inspiring further struggle. This tendency to misstate actual conditions and ignore the balance of forces continues to block any moderate, pragmatic reorientation. And rather than decline, such ideas have now been passed to a new generation. This process is going to be very difficult to reverse.

Finally, there is the problem of Arafat’s anarchic leadership and organizational style. The movement remains a mishmash of rival leaders, institutions and organizations; nationalist and Islamist groups. There is no working chain of command nor any meaningful Left, Right or Center. In fact, no consideration at all is given to economic organization, social policy or any of the other issues that shape political debate elsewhere.

FP: How is Arafat regarded among most Arabs today? How do you think he will be regarded by them in 20 years?

Judith Colp Rubin: Many people believe that Arafat was always very popular throughout the Arab world, but Arafat had a very long history of conflict there. He was kicked out of several Arab countries, such as Jordan and Lebanon, for wrecking havoc there. In Syria, where the former Syrian leader Assad had a longstanding enmity with Arafat, the defense minister once called him the "son of sixty thousand whores," while Saudi Arabia and Kuwait remained furious with him to the end for Arafat's disastrous decision to support Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War. Privately, the dislike for Arafat among Arabs bordered on the laughable. One prominent Arab leader suffering from the flu said that he hoped that he could shake Arafat's hand and pass his illness onto him. Toward the end of his life, Arafat was even more of a pariah in the Arab world with many leaders openly questioning him. In Egypt, where he spent much of his life, a prominent newspaper eulogized that he had been "an obstacle to achieving peace and that he was man too self-centered to really care about the misfortunes of his own people."

FP: Arafat always seemed to be a mystique, a figure not easily understood. Was he really such a mystery?

Judith Colp Rubin: Arafat seemed to be a mystique to the West, because he didn't act in rational ways that would further the interests of his people. But there was, if you will, a certain method to his madness, certain patterns of behavior that marked his life. Such as: When you are losing is precisely the best time to act as if you're the victor; flexibility encourages pressure on yourself, but if you stand firm, conditions will eventually change in your favor; convince adversaries you are ready to make a deal and that one more concession by them will solve everything; denying responsibility for an action or claiming moderation, no matter how obviously untrue, will make some believe you while others suspend judgment; the man who causes crises is the one others must appease to end them; and few will notice if you say contradictory things to different audiences. For example, Arafat learned that a systematic strategy of terrorism does not inhibit diplomatic gains. He was first invited to speak at the United Nations as he directed a campaign of bloody, anti-civilian terrorism against Israel and a string of international atrocities. Experience taught Arafat that militancy and refusal to compromise kept him popular among his own people and in the Arab world. When Arafat initiated violence, it stifled Palestinian criticism of the incompetence and corruption around him, his unfulfilled promises and failed prophecies. These are but a few examples of the Arafat style.

FP: Arafat never really wanted peace with Israel did he?

Judith Colp Rubin: Arafat was unwilling and unable to reach a peace treaty with Israel for at least three main reasons: he felt he could always improve on any deal ever offered him, his demands were beyond anything Israel could ever accept and he knew that making any deal could well leave him worse off.

FP: Why do you think the French and other Westerners loved Arafat so much?

Judith Colp Rubin: Arafat always had the ability to play to his audiences and knew how to use his charm (yes, he had that!). To win over Western journalists, politicians, diplomats or intellectuals, he pretended to be a nice guy who had just been misunderstood, victimized and slandered once compared himself to ET, the lovable refugee extraterrestrial who only wanted to go home. During times of violence, he always gave the impression to the West that he had no control over such actions and he would agree to ceasefires and then do nothing as they were broken. Many in the West believed he was sincere in such actions because his act was so convincing and there was no other Palestinian address.

FP: What did most Palestinians think of Arafat?

Judith Colp Rubin: The conventional wisdom is that Palestinians adored him. But Palestinians complained about him incessantly, told jokes at his expense and knew that it was because of him that their lives were not better. At the time of his death, Arafat was more popular in France than in the Palestinian Authority! In a June 2004 poll less than a quarter of Palestinians named him as the leader they most trusted while in a September poll only 35 percent said they would choose Arafat in an election.

FP: Arafat never really cared about his own people did he? And he ended up severely hurting their cause. Am I correct?

Barry Rubin: Let me put it simply. It would have been possible to resolve the conflict in the 1980s or 1990s on a number of occasions. If that had been the case, many thousands of people on both sides would be alive and the living standards would be far higher. So even though many observers believe that the Palestinian cause only exists today because of Arafat or that he is responsible for building it up successfully, he also kept it frozen in a revolutionary phase which thus kept his people from reaping material benefits from all those years of struggle and suffering. 

FP: Arafat was more interested in killing Jews than in building a Palestinian state. True or False?

Judith Colp Rubins:  It would be more accurate to say that Arafat was more interested in being a revolutionary than in building a Palestinian state. We had initially considered titling our biography, The Last Revolutionary, because Arafat was above all a man who loved the struggle in which he was engaged. This became only too clear when the Palestinian Authority was formed. Rather, than use it as an opportunity to build the foundations of a state Arafat preferred to focus on keeping the struggle going. He still retained the external vestiges of a revolutionary – continuing to wear his military uniform, never settling into a permanent residence in the Palestinian Authority and, most importantly, never showing any interest in building institutions. It is remarkable to consider that never once did Arafat give a speech in which he envisioned what a Palestinian state could and might look like. He was only concerned that he not be forced to compromise on delivering such a state. It is said that Arafat, in considering his legacy, feared above all that sometime in the future there would be an exam in Arab universities: Who was Yasir Arafat, and that the correct answer would be: the man who gave up Palestine to the Jews. He did everything to ensure that that was not the right answer, but, of course, in the end he was not the man who gained Palestine either..

FP: Rubins, it was a pleasure to speak with you again.

Judith Colp Rubin: Thanks for having us again.

Previous Interviews:

Harvey Kushner

Ross Gregory Douthatt

Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin

Jonathan Schanzer

Banafsheh Zand-Bonazzi

Christopher Hitchens

Natan Sharansky

William F. Buckley Jr.

Richard Perle and David Frum